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THE STORY OF A CLASS: USES OF NARRATIVE IN 
PUBLIC INTEREST CLASS ACTIONS BEFORE 
CERTIFICATION 
Anne E. Ralph* 
Abstract: When litigants in public interest class actions tell their stories, the narratives can 
advance the law and influence public debate. But before class members’ stories can vindicate 
civil rights on the merits, plaintiffs must overcome the hurdle of class certification. 
For decades, obtaining class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was not 
a significant challenge for plaintiffs seeking to litigate as a class. But recent restrictive 
procedural developments—including heightened standards for class certification—threaten the 
powerful stories that can be told through public interest class actions. 
Missing in the critical analysis of class action jurisprudence is any discussion of how 
advocates can use narrative techniques to meet that heightened certification standard. 
Similarly, law and narrative scholarship has devoted little attention to the class action. 
This Article begins to fill that gap by engaging in a critical reading of two recent public 
interest class actions: one challenging family separations at the border, and one challenging 
the denial of abortion care to pregnant unaccompanied minors in immigration custody. The 
Article identifies narrative choices that ultimately enable class certification and further 
storytelling in public interest class actions. The Article argues that narrative theory can provide 
an important perspective on the debate over restrictive class action procedure and makes 
recommendations for courts and lawyers to pay greater attention to narrative in class action 
cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Stories have power. During the summer of 2019, the stories of children 
held in immigration custody captured the nation’s attention and 
conscience.1 The narratives emerging from Border Patrol facilities painted 
a “bleak portrait”2: children being held in overcrowded facilities, some ill 
with the flu; children denied access to showers and clean clothing, even 
                                                   
1. See, e.g., Cedar Attanasio et al., Attorneys: Texas Border Facility is Neglecting Migrant Kids, 
ASSOCIATED  PRESS  (June  21,  2019),  https://www.apnews. com/46da2dbe04f54adbb875cfbc06b
bc615 [https://perma.cc/XA28-N89V];   Caitlin Dickerson, ‘There Is a Stench’: Soiled Clothes and 
No Baths for Migrant Children at a Texas Detention Center, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-bordersoap.html [https://perma.cc/J66M-
AZXY]; Simon Romero et al., Hungry, Scared and Sick: Inside the Migrant 
Detention Center in Clint, Tex., N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019),  https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2
019/07/06/us/migrants-border-patrol-clint.html [https://perma.cc/YJP4-52VG].  
2. Attanasio et al., supra note 1.  
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denied access to toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap.3 Lawyers who visited 
the immigration detention facilities described “inadequate food, 
water[,]  and sanitation.”4 
These stories were told first in accounts provided to the news media 
from lawyers visiting the children,5 and then in court filings that included 
first-hand narrative accounts from the detainees themselves.6 As these 
stories entered the public debate, many Americans were moved to action: 
                                                   
3. Dickerson, supra note 1.  
4. Attanasio et al., supra note 1. Some of the detainees were caring for even younger children. Id. 
(“A 2-year-old boy locked in detention wants to be held all the time. A few girls, ages 10 to 15, say 
they’ve been doing their best to feed and soothe the clingy toddler . . . .”). 
5. See, e.g., Paul Farhi, Migrant Children Are Suffering at the Border. But Reporters Are Kept Away from 
the Story., WASH. POST (June 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/migrant-children-are-
suffering-at-the-border-but-reporters-are-kept-away-from-the-story/2019/06/24/500313a2-9693-11e9-8d0a-
5edd7e2025b1_story.html [https://perma.cc/7P4S-XJAY] (“Reporters were unable to see the facilities 
themselves or speak to any of the children. Instead, they relied on descriptions provided by lawyers and 
advocates who were granted access under a legal settlement with the Border Patrol.”). 
6. The standards for detention of unaccompanied minors in immigration custody were established 
in a 1997 consent decree in the Flores litigation. In the summer of 2019, advocates in the Flores 
litigation sought a temporary restraining order and other relief stemming from the violations of the 
Flores Settlement Agreement that they had observed. Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining 
Order and Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction and Contempt Order Should Not Issue, 
Flores v. Barr, No. 2:85-cv-04544-DMG-AGR (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2019). The filing included 
declarations from individual detainees, describing the conditions. See Application for Leave To File 
Under Seal Portions of Exhibits Submitted in Support of Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction and Contempt 
Order Should Not Issue and Memorandum in Support, Barr, No. 2:85-cv-04544-DMG-AGR 
(attaching redacted declarations of minors held in immigration custody); see also id. at Exhibit 32 (“I 
am often hungry . . . . I have not showered in 4 days . . . . I have been able to brush my teeth only once 
since I arrived, 7 days ago.”). The narratives filed in Flores reached the public through new stories 
reporting on the filing’s content. See, e.g., Meagan Flynn, Attorneys Seek Emergency Court Order to 
End ‘Health and Welfare Crisis’ in Migrant Detention  Centers,  WASH.  POST  (June  27,  2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/27/attorneys-seek-emergency-court-order-end-
health-welfare-crisis-migrant-detention-centers/ [https://perma.cc/V8HY-52MU] (discussing the 
content of the Flores filing). 
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individual citizens engaged in protests7; elected officials spoke out and 
held hearings;8 and presidential candidates visited the detention centers.9 
The stories of children in immigration detention could be told because 
of a public-interest class action lawsuit, the Flores litigation, which 
granted attorneys access to visit children in detention facilities.10 These 
stories came to light because of work done, decades earlier, to bring a 
lawsuit and obtain certification of a class of plaintiffs.11 Among other 
things, the post-certification settlement agreement in the Flores litigation 
established a requirement that children in immigration detention be held 
“in facilities that are safe and sanitary and . . . consistent with 
the . . . concern for the particular vulnerability of minors.”12 The post-
                                                   
7. See, e.g., Claire Hao, Hundreds Protest Immigration Detention Camps, Walk Through Downtown 
Carrying  ‘Lights  for  Liberty’  Candles,  MICH.  DAILY  (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.michigandaily.com/section/government/hundreds-protest-immigration-detention-camps-walk-
through-downtown-carrying- [https://perma.cc/3Y5D-AUSD] (describing demonstration in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan); Lee Matz, LULAC Members Swarm Senator Ron Johnson’s Milwaukee Office in Protest of “Kids 
in  Cages”  at  Border,  MILWAUKEE  IND.  (July 17, 2019), 
http://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/featured/lulac-members-swarm-senator-ron-johnsons-milwaukee-
office-protest-kids-cages-border/ [https://perma.cc/RN5J-XB6T] (describing a demonstration by members of 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) at the Milwaukee office of U.S. Senator Ron Johnson). 
8. See Ryan Nguyen, U.S. Sen. Jeff Merkley Recounts Scenes of Migrant Abuse to Portland Crowd, 
WILLAMETTE WEEK (July 28, 2019), https://www.wweek.com/news/2019/07/28/u-s-sen-jeff-
merkley-recounts-scenes-of-migrant-abuse-to-portland-crowd/  [https://perma.cc/658J-NBYJ] 
(reporting on U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley’s public accounts of visits to immigration detention centers); 
Maria Sacchetti, ‘Kids in Cages’: House Hearing Examines Immigration Detention as Democrats 
Push  for  More  Information,  WASH.  POST  (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/kids-in-cages-house-hearing-to-examine-
immigration-detention-as-democrats-push-for-more-information/2019/07/10/3cc53006-a28f-11e9-
b732-41a79c2551bf_story.html [https://perma.cc/6P23-DJ6N] (reporting on a hearing before the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties). 
9. See David Weigel et al., Before Debate, Democrats Visit Children’s Migrant Shelter Amid Fresh 
Fury  over  Conditions,  WASH.  POST  (June 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/b
efore-debate-democrats-visit-childrens-migrant-shelter-amid-fresh-fury-over-
conditions/2019/06/26/08ed7de4-9815-11e9-8d0a-5edd7e2025b1_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/S87L-L688]. 
10. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997) 
[hereinafter Flores Settlement Agreement], https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/flores_v_meese_agree
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P7H-YVRQ].  
11. See Gail Q. Goeke, Substantive and Procedural Due Process for Unaccompanied Alien 
Juveniles, 60 MO. L. REV. 221, 221 (1995). The Flores Settlement Agreement ended litigation 
regarding children in immigration custody that lasted over a decade. Devon A. Corneal, On the Way 
to Grandmother’s House: Is U.S. Immigration Policy More Dangerous Than the Big Bad Wolf for 
Unaccompanied Juvenile Aliens, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 609, 642 (2004). For a concise history of the 
Flores litigation, see Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of 
Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 794–95 (2018).  
12. Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, ¶¶ 11, 12. Among other things, the Flores 
Settlement Agreement requires the government to hold minors in immigration custody “in the least 
restrictive setting appropriate,” and requires minors to be detained “in facilities that are safe and 
sanitary.” Id. The agreement also requires facilities holding minors to “provide access to toilets and 
sinks, drinking water and food as appropriate, medical assistance . . . adequate temperature control 
and ventilation, [and] adequate supervision . . . .” Id. ¶ 12.  
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certification settlement agreement also granted children in custody the 
right to attorney-client visits—the visits that ultimately enabled these 
stories to be told.13 
The stories the Flores litigation helped to bring forth illustrate the 
power of the public interest class action and the narratives that it enables. 
The public interest class action makes possible a great deal of civil rights 
enforcement on behalf of private citizens against government actors.14 
Public interest class actions have benefited myriad groups seeking 
structural remedies,15 such as prisoners,16 foster children,17 and 
individuals with disabilities.18 In addition to furthering the goals of civil 
rights statutes through enforcement,19 public interest class actions allow 
litigants to communicate their stories through official channels, attracting 
public attention in a particularly powerful way.20 
But before class members’ rights can be vindicated, and before their 
stories can be told with the kind of detail that can advance the law and 
mobilize public opinion, plaintiffs must overcome the hurdle of class 
certification. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their claims are similar 
enough that group treatment, rather than individualized determinations 
and remedies, is the appropriate mechanism for resolving their claims.21 
Two requirements of class certification are particularly important to 
                                                   
13. Id. at ¶ 32. The Flores Settlement Agreement also requires a coordinator to monitor the 
government’s compliance with the agreement’s terms. Id. ¶ 28A. 
14. David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 780–81 (2016) (defining 
“public interest class action” as “litigation brought against government officials and agencies for 
injunctive relief”).  
15. Id. at 781. 
16. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), cited in Marcus, supra note 14, at 785 n.50. 
17. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM. & ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, CHILD WELFARE 
CONSENT DECREES: ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE COURT ACTIONS FROM 1995 TO 2005, at 2 (2005), 
cited in Marcus, supra note 14, at 784 n.45.  
18. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and 
Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 903–04 (2006), cited in Marcus, supra note 14, at 784 n.44.  
19. See Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997) (“Civil rights and class actions have an historic partnership. Indeed, 
those who revised the federal class action rules in 1966 took particularly into account the concerns of 
civil rights litigants.”); Marcus, supra note 14, at 783 (“The class action and impact litigation are and 
have always been inseparable.”); David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: 
Sturm und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 593 (2013) (the class action “pushes the 
substantive law closer to maximal implementation”). 
20. Litigation, including class actions, can bring information to the public’s attention “by forcing 
information out into the open that would otherwise remain hidden.” ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE 
OF LITIGATION 8 (2017). Litigation can also spur public conversation about the issues at the heart of 
a case. Id. at 9. 
21. In order for a class to be recognized, a court must find that the putative class members “share 
some traits making it appropriate to recognize a representative empowered to pursue their claims.” 
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 2 
(1987); see also infra notes 152–215 and accompanying text.  
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plaintiffs seeking to move forward with all the strength that the class 
designation affords. First, plaintiffs in a public interest class action must 
demonstrate, pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2), that “there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class.”22 Second, such plaintiffs must demonstrate, 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), that “the party opposing the class has acted or 
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 
respecting the class as a whole.”23 
For decades, class certification was not a significant challenge for 
plaintiffs.24 Recently, however, restrictive procedural developments, 
including those developed in the Supreme Court’s 2011 Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes25 decision, have heightened the standard plaintiffs must meet 
to achieve class certification in public interest class actions.26 The Wal-
Mart decision generated (and continues to generate) significant criticism 
for its interpretation of the Rule 23(a)(2) “commonality” standard, as well 
as for its impact on classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which governs 
most public interest class actions.27 
Missing in the critical scholarly conversation is any discussion of how 
advocates can use narrative techniques to meet that heightened 
certification standard. Scholarship in law and narrative has also largely 
ignored the class action, which uses and produces narratives in ways not 
seen in more traditional litigation. Individual narratives in public interest 
class actions are a rich ground for critical narrative study, and that study 
can provide insight into questions of class action doctrine. The way 
individual narratives function in public interest class actions prior to 
certification echoes the theoretical tensions inherent in the concept of 
                                                   
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).  
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  
24. Marcus, supra note 14, at 781. 
25. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011); see also Marcus, supra note 14, at 
792 (“Few doubt that the decision raises the bar for class certification.”). 
26. Marcus, supra note 14, at 781 (“Present-day upheaval in class action procedure threatens to 
alter—perhaps to imperil—structural reform litigation in the federal courts. Without class 
certification, a lot of structural reform litigation will prove much more difficult to bring.”).  
27. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 345–59 (addressing the “commonality” requirement for class 
actions). Prior to Wal-Mart, the commonality requirement “was seen as easy to satisfy, with the 
necessary showing being characterized as ‘minimal’ and permissibly construed.” A. Benjamin 
Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
441, 463 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
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group litigation,28 especially as those tensions play out in an era of 
restrictive procedure.29 
This Article begins to fill the gap in the literature by conducting a 
critical reading of litigation documents in two recent public interest class 
actions: one challenging family separations at the border,30 and one 
challenging the denial of abortion care to pregnant, unaccompanied 
minors in immigration custody, which culminated in a 2019 D.C. Circuit 
opinion affirming class certification.31 
The Article’s narrative analysis yields several observations about how 
the parties use narrative before class certification—choices that ultimately 
enable the kinds of stories that make legal and cultural change possible. 
The Article critically assesses the nuanced narrative techniques that assist 
plaintiffs in achieving class certification in a challenging procedural 
context and concludes that narrative is doing important work in public 
interest class actions at the certification phase. This Article also makes 
recommendations for courts and lawyers to pay greater attention to the 
workings and complications of storytelling in class action cases. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an essential 
background on narrative, the characteristics that make narratives 
persuasive, and the values that narrative serves in civil litigation generally. 
Part II addresses the procedure and doctrine of class actions, and in 
particular public interest class actions; this part also reviews recent 
restrictive procedural developments through a narrative-theory lens. 
Finally, Part III conducts a critical reading of the narratives in two recent 
public interest class action cases. Part III makes three novel observations 
about the narrative techniques that aid advocates in demonstrating the 
requirements for class certification. Effective class certification briefing 
presents what this Article calls “die cut” narratives, which repeat key 
phrases and sentence structures to emphasize commonality. “Die cut” 
narratives are told at a high level, fully coherent but devoid of 
personalized details. Although this method is effective at emphasizing 
commonality, it may deprive the briefing of the sympathetic details that 
make public interest class actions compelling to judges both on the merits 
                                                   
28. See Deborah R. Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23: Shouldn’t We Know You Better 
After All This Time, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1600 (2017) (“The joining of group litigation with a 
legal regime based on individual autonomy was long considered a marriage of convenience, justified 
by the inefficiency of resolving large numbers of claims arising out of the same facts and law in 
individual proceedings.” (footnote omitted)).  
29. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 781; Spencer, supra note 27, at 448 (stating Wal-Mart “is also 
disquieting in light of the Court’s other recent decisions trending in the direction of restricting access 
to justice by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring claims and have them heard”).  
30. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 18cv0428, 2018 WL 8665001, at 
*2 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2018) (granting motion for class certification in part). 
31. J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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and at the class certification stage. Finally, Part III makes 
recommendations for judges and lawyers to incorporate more vigorous 
and explicit narrative analysis around class certification. 
I. THE STORY OF NARRATIVE IN LITIGATION 
Narrative and civil litigation are inextricably connected.32 Stories are 
told and retold in litigation, from the client’s initial conversation with a 
lawyer, to the recounting of events in written pleadings and motions, from 
the oral testimony of witnesses and opening and closing statements of 
counsel at trial, to the final, canonical recitations of the facts of a case in 
a court opinion.33 
Despite its inherent appeal, the connection between litigation and 
narrative bears further explanation in order to support this Article’s 
claims. The following section covers the concepts encompassed by this 
Article’s use of the term “narrative,” how narrative works to persuade, 
and how narratives interact with litigation procedure. 
A. Narrative: What it Means 
Because the concept of narrative is central to this Article’s claims, a 
precise definition of “narrative” is needed. Though narrative is vital to 
law, the term is often used in legal scholarship without attention to its 
meaning.34 Indeed, the term is often used imprecisely. 
A narrative requires certain irreducible elements. Amsterdam and 
Bruner offer this “austere definition” of “what is necessary to make a 
story”: the narrative needs “a cast of human-like characters . . . capable of 
willing their own actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs, having 
feelings.”35 The narrative “also needs a plot with a beginning, a middle, 
and an end, in which particular characters are involved in particular 
events.”36 To unfold, “the plot requires . . . an initial steady state . . . that 
gets disrupted by a Trouble . . . in turn evoking efforts at redress or 
transformation, which succeed or fail . . . so that that the old steady state 
is restored or a new (transformed) steady state is created.”37 
For the purposes of this Article, the following definition of narrative is 
                                                   
32. “Law lives on narrative.” ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 
110 (2000). 
33. “[T]he law is awash in storytelling.” Id.  
34. See Anne E. Ralph, Narrative-Erasing Procedure, 18 NEV. L.J. 573, 576 (2018). 
35. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 113. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 113–14 (emphasis in original). 
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appropriate: “[t]he representation of an event or a series of events.”38 A 
second definition, also appropriate for this Article, incorporates the 
important concepts of audience and purpose: “[S]omebody telling 
somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that 
something  happened.”39 
This Article’s use of “narrative” should not be confused with less 
precise uses of the term. The important distinction to make, for lawyers 
and for legal scholars, is that the term narrative, as used here, does not 
mean a general treatment or a broad-strokes summary.40 For purposes of 
this Article, “narrative” means a particular representation of an event or a 
series of events. 
The narrative is not synonymous with the underlying event or events 
told about in the narrative.41 As well, for the purposes of this Article, it is 
important to distinguish between narrative as a distinct entity on the one 
hand, and data or facts on the other. Points of data, alone, are not 
narratives. Similarly, one singular fact does not make a narrative. Indeed, 
mere collections of data and facts, without more, do not constitute 
narratives.42 Nor do compilations of dates and events, without more, 
constitute narratives. Something more is required to constitute a 
narrative—that is, the sense of connection, causation, and forward motion 
that Amsterdam and Bruner’s definition of narrative embodies.43 
A narrative is one “telling” or one “version” of a story that might be 
told in many ways. Different tellings, different audiences, and different 
purposes all give rise to different narratives. At its most basic then, a 
narrative is one representation of events, put together for an audience and 
for a particular purpose. 
                                                   
38. H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 13 (2008).  
39. James Phelan, Narratives in Contest; Or, Another Twist in the Narrative Turn, 123 
PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANGUAGE ASS’N 166, 167 (2008). Though the work of some narratologists 
distinguishes between the terms “narrative” and “story,” this Article refers to a narrative and story 
interchangeably, to be consistent with the way those terms are likely to be understood and used by 
law-trained academics, judges, and practicing lawyers. See ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 16. 
40. See, e.g., Simon Stern, Narrative in the Legal Text: Judicial Opinions and Their Narratives, in 
NARRATIVE AND METAPHOR IN LAW 124 (Michael Hanne & Robert Weisberg eds., 2018) (“[L]egal 
scholars often speak of ‘narratives’ when they mean something else . . . .”).  
41. Ralph, supra note 34, at 576 (“A narrative is the representation of the events that occur.”).  
42. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 123 (“Statistics can tell us that we are in, say, 
the lowest quartile of income in the city; but only through narrative do we come to understand whether 
that is bad luck, a sign of personal fecklessness, or an injustice.”).  
43. Stories are “always about events extended over time.” AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, 
at 120; see also id. at 127 (“Stories go somewhere. They have an end, a telos.”).  
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B. Narrative: How it Persuades 
Narrative represents a fundamental mode of human communication 
and a key form of persuasion both in law and more broadly in human 
experience. Narrative theory studies how stories are written or composed, 
how they are transmitted, and how they are received by an audience.44 As 
this section describes, narrative theory teaches what we seem to know 
innately: that stories are a powerful way of understanding and 
communicating our human experiences. 
On an individual level, narrative is deeply engrained in the way we 
interact with the world. As Jerome Bruner has written, “we organize our 
experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of 
narrative—stories, . . . myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so 
on.”45 In fact, Bruner has written that having a narrative of one’s own life 
is an essential component of having a sense of self.46 Collectively, groups 
of people tell and retell stories as a means of sharing human experiences 
and creating communities and culture.47 
Cognitive science has revealed that people understand the world by 
categorizing sense experiences into “schemas” that allow us to create a 
kind of “shorthand for an event or series of events that we’ve seen, heard, 
or experienced before.”48 A schema “contains general knowledge about a 
particular subject, including relationships between events and 
occurrences.”49 
We match our experiences to these schemas, likely unconsciously, 
which allows us to process what we are experiencing and predict what we 
will encounter next.50 By calling on multiple schemas at once, humans 
                                                   
44. Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old Story: Using Narrative Theory to Understand and Overcome 
the Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 YALE L.J. & HUMAN. 1, 25 (2014) (“Narrative theory answers 
the complex question of why narratives are persuasive. Narrative theory also seeks to explain the 
characteristics that every narrative possesses and how those characteristics function.”). 
45. Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 4 (1991). See 
also AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 30–31 (“So predisposed is the human mind to 
narrative that we even experience the events of everyday life in narrative form and assign them to 
categories derived from some particular kind of story.”). 
46. Jerome Bruner, Life as Narrative, 54 SOC. RES. 11, 11 (1987). 
47. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 116–17.  
48. Ralph, supra note 34, at 579. 
49. Ralph, supra note 44, at 26 (citing Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The 
Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1133 (2004)). 
Other concepts that have a similar meaning as “schema” include, “mental blueprints” or “stock 
structures,” or “categories.” See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 19 (noting “[c]ategories 
are ubiquitous and inescapable in the use of mind” and even lawyers and judges cannot do without 
them); Ralph, supra note 34, at 579. 
50. See Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger? A Field Guide to Metaphor and Narrative, 50 
WASHBURN L.J. 275, 282 (2011); see also Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures 
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innately organize experiences into narrative form.51 Our schemas also 
allow us to communicate our experiences to others.52 Some of these 
schemas are in fact stories: narratives with plots, meaning a beginning, 
middle, and end.53 
Some schemas represent stories that have special persuasive and 
cultural power. As people tell and retell their experiences in narrative form 
within a community, the community develops a pool of “stock scripts” 
that “embody normal expectations and normal practice in a culture”54 and 
that “play out recurrent situations in our lives.”55 They allow us to “assess 
and interpret [our] circumstances and shape judgment regarding [our] 
experience,” even regarding events we have not experienced before but 
about which we know stock scripts.56 With respect to these scripts, “we 
don’t so much create them as assimilate them from the people with whom 
we live.”57 
Some of these stock structures achieve heightened cultural 
significance. Through stories to which we refer as archetypes, cultural 
master stories, or cultural master narratives,58 we “connect vitally with our 
deepest values, wishes and fears.”59 Some master narratives appear to be 
universal, such as “the quest[ or] the story of revenge.”60 As the name 
suggests, many cultural master narratives are specific to individual 
cultures; indeed, “the more culturally specific the [master narrative], the 
greater its practical force in everyday life.”61 
Master narratives “can have strong rhetorical impact” in that people 
tend to attribute credibility to narratives that correspond with or are 
                                                   
Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in 
Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 264 (2009). 
51. Jennifer Sheppard, Once upon a Time, Happily Ever after, and in a Galaxy Far, Far Away: 
Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in Appellate Briefs and 
Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 261 (2009) (“[N]arrative form is ‘an innate 
schema’ for the organization and understanding of human experience.” (footnote omitted)).  
52. Ralph, supra note 34, at 580 (“To the extent we share the same underlying schemas as others, 
we can understand what others are doing or even thinking. The more schemas with which we are 
familiar, the better we are able to understand the world.”). 
53. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 30–31. 
54. Id. at 121. 
55. Id. at 45.  
56. Ralph, supra note 44, at 26. 
57. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 45. 
58. See ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 43. A master narrative also could be called a “masterplot,” “story 
skeleton,” “canonical story,” or an “archetype.” Id. As Abbott has noted, it is confusing that these 
recurring cultural schemas are called “master narratives,” because narratives are technically 
individual instances of storytelling. Id. at 43.  
59. Id. at 42.  
60. Id. at 43.  
61. Id.  
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structured like cultural master narratives.62 Often, master narratives have 
moral content, because they “create an image of the world in which good 
and evil are clearly identifiable, and in which blame can fall squarely on 
one party or another.”63 We tend to think about events, including events 
in our own lives, through the lens of master narratives, but we tend not to 
be conscious of those master narratives while they are doing their work 
on us.64 In fact, “[s]ome would argue that our identities are so invested in 
[the master narratives that we know], that when [they] are activated it is 
impossible to break out of the vision they create.”65 
As do all national cultures, American culture—and American law, as 
well—has its own master narratives.66 Importantly, “no culture can be 
summed up” with just one master narrative.67 Different groups develop 
different master narratives for explaining the same events.68 In short, the 
master narratives that we will apply to our experiences of the world are 
profoundly determined by the culture within which we live. 
In addition to cultural recognition, other well-recognized properties 
drive narratives’ persuasive power. Narrative scholars have determined 
three properties that make narratives psychologically persuasive69: 
narrative coherence, narrative correspondence, and narrative fidelity.70 
Narratives tend to be convincing to the extent they demonstrate 
these features.71 
First, persuasive narratives demonstrate “narrative coherence.”72 
Narrative coherence describes a story’s “internal consistency” as well as 
its “completeness.”73 In an internally consistent narrative, all “the parts of 
the story fit together [well].”74 A narrative is internally consistent when 
all its parts relate in a “quasi-logical” way and do not contradict each 
                                                   
62. Id. at 42.  
63. Id. at 44.  
64. Id. at 42.  
65. Id. at 45.  
66. Id. at 43–44 (explaining the American master narrative of the “Horatio Alger story” as a “local 
variation” on a universal master narrative).  
67. Id. at 44.  
68. Id.; ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: NARRATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE 57 (Peter Brooks 
& Paul Gerwitz eds., 1990) (“Different people understand the same story differently precisely because 
the stories they already know are different.”). 
69. J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL 
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 56 (2008).  
70. Id. at 55. 
71. Id. at 86.  
72. Id. at 63. 
73. Id. at 64. 
74. Id. 
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other.75 The inferences an audience member makes unconsciously can 
support a sense of internal consistency: as long as the parts of a story do 
not contradict one another, the audience member will put the key elements 
together and make inferences to connect them.76 On the other hand, where 
the parts of a story are contradictory or ambiguous, it will be 
less  persuasive.77 
To achieve narrative coherence, the story must also be complete, in that 
“the sum total of the parts of the story seems” adequate.78 Even an 
internally consistent story may be unpersuasive if it is incomplete.79 A 
complete story contains all the expected parts needed to make a 
narrative.80 A story that is missing, for instance, “important facts,” will 
not strike the audience as complete.81 
Persuasive narratives also embody the property of narrative 
correspondence.82 Correspondence requires a connection to what the 
audience “knows about what typically happens in the world.”83 This 
property has a normative component: A story that possesses narrative 
correspondence will match “not only . . . a sense of what happens in the 
world, but to socially normative versions of what happens in the world.”84 
Narrative correspondence gives stories plausibility.85 
Narrative correspondence relates to social knowledge, including stock 
scripts and cultural master narratives, in that a narrative will “appear 
plausible to the extent that it manifests similarity with some model of 
narrative which exists within the stock of social knowledge . . . .”86 
Audience members, receiving a story, take the information in the story 
and test it against “the vast store of background knowledge about social 
                                                   
75. Id. at 64–65; see also BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT, AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 
58  (1988). 
76. See Rideout, supra note 69, at 65. 
77. Id.; see also ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 168 (1999) (“[A] story may be 
implausible simply because the relationships among the key story elements are indeterminate or 
ambiguous.”); Ralph, supra note 44, at 28. 
78. Rideout, supra note 69, at 64.  
79. Id. at 65.  
80. Id.  
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 66.  
83. Id.  
84. Id.  
85. J. Christopher Rideout, A Twice-Told Tale: Plausibility and Narrative Coherence in Judicial 
Storytelling, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 67, 71 (2013). 
86. Rideout, supra note 69, at 67; see also W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 
48–50 (1981).  
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life” encoded in the stock scripts and master narratives they know.87 That 
background knowledge allows audience members to “fill in the 
framework of connections” as they make inferences that will help them 
interpret the story.88 
Finally, persuasive narratives also exhibit “narrative fidelity.”89 
Narrative fidelity encompasses the concept of “whether a story constitutes 
good reasons for belief or action,” with respect to the “historical and social 
setting” in which the audience is situated.90 This characteristic goes 
“beyond a narrative’s structure and its correspondence to the stock stories 
of the culture” and instead describes “the narrative’s similarity to what an 
audience member knows to be true in the real world.”91 Narrative fidelity 
requires a kind of “communal validity” for the audience, “grounded in 
historical and social particulars.”92 
Within this framework, we can understand the use of narrative 
techniques—the tools in the storyteller’s toolbox that help to create 
coherence, correspondence, and fidelity. All parts of a story contribute to 
its persuasive effect, even those not strictly required for a narrative.93 For 
instance, the storyteller can use sequence to make the narrative persuasive. 
Although a narrative must have a plot, it need not be chronological. The 
sequence in which the writer presents events can affect the narrative’s 
persuasiveness.94 
Similarly, the kinds of details and level of detail that a writer chooses 
to use can affect the story’s persuasiveness.95 Details can affect the way 
                                                   
87. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 86, at 50.  
88. Id.  
89. Rideout, supra note 69, at 69.  
90. Id. 72.  
91. Ralph, supra note 44, at 30.  
92. Rideout, supra note 69, at 75, 76.  
93. ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 48. For instance, in constructing a story, the setting of a story is 
optional, unlike events and characters. Id. at 17. But details about the story’s setting “can exert 
considerable rhetorical leverage on the way [an audience member] read[s].” Id. at 48. 
94. A writer’s “choice of beginning point has large implications for who the actors in [her] story 
will be and what their conduct will mean.” JAMES B. WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: 
ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL EXPERIENCE 33 (1999); see also CAROLYN GROSE & MARGARET E. 
JOHNSON, LAWYERS, CLIENTS & NARRATIVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR LAW STUDENTS AND 
PRACTITIONERS 15 (2017) (“[P]eople are wired to look for causation in the transpiring of events. In 
constructing a narrative . . . the author sequences events in a way to explain the cause and effect.”).  
95. “Details elicit emotion, create mental pictures, stimulate associations, and lend coherence and 
fidelity to narratives.” Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to 
Pleading Practice, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 40 (2009). Detailed language allows a writer to 
“range in . . . descriptions of things from the concrete to the quite abstract. We get more concreteness 
by using words that are more fine-grained, more vivid, more graphic. Multiplying details . . . also 
adds solidity.” AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 177.  
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the people and entities involved in the narrative appear to the reader.96 
Finally, a storyteller must also consider point of view—“the perspective 
from which the reader . . . experiences the story.”97 Traditionally, in 
litigation narratives, “the attorney is the narrator, telling [the client’s] 
story from a lawyer’s point of view.”98 
C. Narrative: How it Works in Litigation 
Narratives pervade litigation, supporting important values in civil 
litigation.99 The litigation process generates multiple narratives.100 For 
instance, Jane telling her spouse what the boss said before firing her is one 
narrative. Jane later telling her lawyer what the boss said before firing her 
is yet another narrative.101 An additional, separate narrative results when 
the lawyer drafts numbered paragraphs in a complaint recounting the 
factual background of the firing that underlies Jane’s legal claims.102 A 
narrative results from Jane retelling the story of her firing at her 
deposition.103 If the case proceeds to trial, yet another narrative might 
come out of her trial testimony about the firing, which will be made in 
response to direct and cross-examination questions.104 Her attorney’s 
opening and closing statements—as well of those of the opposing party—
will also be narratives. 
As the parties generate narratives, they constantly test their narratives 
against one another.105 In litigation, “the contesting of interpretation is 
                                                   
96. Well-developed characters will “feel real to the reader,” and the reader can “be persuaded to 
empathize with” characters. Fajans & Falk, supra note 94, at 30.  
97. Cathren Koehlert-Page, Come a Little Closer So I Can See You My Pretty: The Use and Limits 
of Fiction Techniques for Establishing an Empathetic Point of View in Appellate Briefs, 80 UMKC 
L. REV. 399, 404 (2011). A writer has considerable ability to manage the “closeness” between the 
reader and the story’s characters. Id.  
98. Fajans & Falk, supra note 94, at 37. The lawyer’s voice (usually “uninflected, unemotional 
language”) can “produce[] an appearance of objectivity that enhances credibility,” but can also 
“distance[] the reader from the narrative and induces her to withhold judgment as to the truth of the 
matter.” Id. at 37. 
99. See Ralph, supra note 34, at 575. 
100. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 110. 
101. See JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 243 (abridged ed. 1985) (noting the lawyer 
“must know how to tell a story, and how to listen to one: he starts with the story the client tells 
him; . . . he then tells the story over and over again to himself and to others, . . . constantly varying 
the terms of his narrative but coming at last to a version (or perhaps more than one) cast in terms of 
legal conclusion”). 
102. See, e.g., Ralph, supra note 44, at 41.  
103. Ralph, supra note 34, at 601. Discovery can contain narratives; even discovery that is not 
narrative serves a related purpose in that it generates information for the creation of future narratives. 
Id. at 598, 603. 
104. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 110.  
105. Ralph, supra note 34, at 584. James Boyd White has called a legal dispute “a kind of narrative 
competition.” WHITE, supra note 94, at 33. 
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expected: the conventions of the genre call for oppositional debate.”106 
During litigation, parties put forth competing narratives in an attempt to 
activate powerful master narratives belonging to their audience.107 
Particularly skilled lawyers tell client stories in ways that invoke listeners’ 
views of the world, counting on the fact that the listeners will thus supply 
inferences about the facts of the case.108 In this contest of narratives, the 
parties ask legal decisionmakers to determine the ending of the story.109 
In writing opinions, judges re-narrate the story of the parties and write 
the ending as they explain why the case is a particular type of tale—say, 
one consistent with liability—and not another.110 Judges select facts that 
not only explain their decisions but also persuade.111 Even in lawsuits that 
do not reach a decisionmaker in the form of a trial jury or a judge hearing 
dispositive motions, the parties nonetheless highlight and evaluate the 
strength of the stories they can tell as they work towards settlement. 
Narrative concepts are also foundational to the way the law progresses 
in our common-law system.112 The American common-law system, 
resting on the principle of stare decisis, under which like cases should be 
decided in like manner, can be understood through narrative principles as 
a storytelling system. Parties tell stories about what happened between 
them—stories for which the law will, one party hopes, provide a remedy. 
Plaintiffs tell stories that they hope will lead to the conclusion that what 
happened to them matches previous cases where plaintiffs have prevailed; 
defendants tell stories to support the conclusion that what happened 
doesn’t match cases where defendants were found liable. The successful 
party will match the facts to an earlier tale matching her desired outcome 
on liability. As parties argue about the correct story to be told about the 
underlying events, they invite a decisionmaker (the judge or jury) to write 
                                                   
106. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 173 (emphasis omitted); see also JEROME BRUNER, 
MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 37 (2002) ( “[O]pposing stories are at the heart of what 
we loosely refer to as ‘having your day in court.’”). 
107. ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 44.  
108. See id. at 45. 
109. The legal process is “at its heart . . . a way of telling a story about what has happened in the 
world and claiming a meaning for it by writing an ending to it.” JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: 
ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 36 (1985).  
110. See, e.g., Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. 
REV. 517, 571–72 (1991). 
111. See id. (“[T]he ‘facts’ that appear in a decision are those that the judge chose to mention. 
Judges who want to write persuasive opinions often emphasize facts that support their positions and 
ignore or downplay other facts . . . . In some [Supreme Court] cases, the majority and the dissent view 
the facts so differently that one might wonder whether the Justices read the same record.”).  
112. Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 
24, 25 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“[S]torytelling offers real continuities with 
common-law reasoning; it dwells on particulars while eliciting a point that itself may be molded or 
recast in light of the story’s particulars reviewed in a different time.”). 
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the ending to the story. With each new case, a court takes the story of the 
parties before it and attempts to fit that story into the models of earlier 
law-stories. Thus, our system of deciding like cases in like manners 
resembles the model of narrative correspondence that J. Christopher 
Rideout has described: “[a] narrative is plausible, and persuasive, to the 
extent that it bears a structural correspondence to one of these stock scripts 
or stories.”113 
The importance of narratives in litigation is not limited to the impact 
those narratives have on court opinions and the related long-term 
development of the law. In addition to advancing the substantive law, 
narratives developed in litigation serve other values: they can give 
participants a sense of procedural justice, can inform public debate, and 
can assist us in gaining a broader understanding of our past and ourselves. 
Indeed, one important way in which the legal rules and procedures of 
litigation impact American democracy is bringing to light narratives. 
Throughout litigation, legal rules and procedures shape the kinds of 
stories that can be narrated. As I have written, some legal rules threaten to 
erase narratives from litigation altogether.114 
The narratives revealed in lawsuits are “important for public debate.”115 
Furthermore, the information revealed in lawsuits can help people—
litigants and other members of the public alike—form their own narratives 
that help them understand the world.116 Thus, the legal narratives 
described here can support a broader catalog of law-stories that are 
knowable in the world and that are useful for future lawsuits.117 
This account of narrative has described some of the roles stories can 
play in civil litigation. The rules and procedures governing class action 
litigation place additional dimensions of pressure on individual narratives. 
The next section explains those rules and procedures. As the next section 
will demonstrate, the class action is a unique procedural creation in 
American litigation. This uniqueness has particular import for the way 
narratives work in class actions. 
                                                   
113. Rideout, supra note 69, at 67.  
114. See Ralph, supra note 34, at 600. I have written elsewhere about the pressure that procedure 
places on narratives in litigation. For instance, the heightened “plausibility” pleading standard 
encourages lawyers to frame client stories so as to best fit within already-existing “stock” narratives, 
rather than advancing potentially path-breaking narratives. Similarly, the recently introduced 
“proportional” discovery standard requires parties to make choices about discovery that may narrow 
their narrative options down the road.  
115. LAHAV, supra note 20, at 144; see also id. at 83 (explaining that access to information is 
“critical” to citizens’ ability to participate in self-government). 
116. See id. at 61 (“The process of legal argument . . . also helps people form information into 
narratives in order to understand the world and create social meaning. These narratives provide 
frameworks for understanding the past and the present . . . .”).  
117. Ralph, supra note 34, at 607 (“Over time, as an expanding catalog of legal narratives have 
been contested and resolved in litigation, new legal pathways develop. Thus, narratives enable the 
law to accommodate citizens in constantly changing times.”).  
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II. PUBLIC INTEREST CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE 
This Part lays the groundwork of the law and rules governing public 
interest class action litigation. Class action litigation is procedurally 
complicated, both because of the rules themselves and because of 
additional hurdles created by court interpretations of the rules. The 
following section explains the Article’s focus on public interest class 
actions; describes the procedural background for such lawsuits; and 
explores the Supreme Court’s 2011 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 
decision, which has been widely criticized for raising the standards that 
plaintiffs must meet to achieve class certification. 
A. Setting the Scene: Why Focus on Public Interest Class Actions? 
This Article focuses on public interest class actions, meaning suits 
against government officials or government entities, seeking injunctive or 
declaratory relief, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2).118 Examples of public 
interest class action litigation include challenges to jail and prison 
conditions, litigation seeking reform of foster care systems, and school 
desegregation cases.119 The Flores litigation and settlement described 
above began as a 23(b)(2) class action.120 
A class action lawsuit “permits a large group of persons temporarily to 
become a single litigative entity” in order to seek a “collective legal 
remedy.”121 The class action as a procedural device has roots in equity,122 
but it became a prominent feature of American litigation in the federal 
                                                   
118. Marcus, supra note 14, at 780–81. Rule 23(b)(2) provides for class treatment when the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 
on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). The Rule 23(b)(2) class 
action was designed to be used in segregation cases. See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: 
Desegregation Litigation and its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702 
(2011) (“The only recorded considerations to have shaped the provision [Rule 23(b)(2)] involved 
concerns about desegregation litigation.”). Describing situations Rule 23(b)(2) was “intended to 
reach,” the Advisory Committee stated: “Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where 
a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are 
incapable of specific enumeration.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes to 
1966  amendment.  
119. The possible constituents of a class are broad. YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 1. 
120. See Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 10. 
121. Id. In class action litigation “the group presents itself in court and is not only recognized as a 
litigative entity but is also in effect given a valuable piece of property at the same time—its right to 
sue on behalf of all members of the class.” Id. at 3.  
122. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).  
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courts after a 1966 change to the Federal Rules, when the Rule 23(b)(1), 
(b)(2) and (b)(3) classes were instituted.123 
As an entity, a class has power that individual litigants simply do not.124 
The class action is an exception to the traditional American rule that each 
individual must litigate her own claim on her own behalf,125 a rule that 
recognizes both the individual’s right to control her own suit and the 
general principle that she should not be bound by a judgment unless she 
is party to a case.126 Because the class action subverts the individual-
lawsuit principle, it is accompanied by strict procedural requirements.127 
As distinguished from individual litigation, the class action relies on a 
more “collective vision.”128 The class action achieves representation for 
groups by making the group, rather than the individual litigant, the 
relevant party.129 By allowing litigants, including those with relatively low 
political and economic power, to pool their claims, class actions help 
ensure rights vindication.130 Allowing individuals to sue as a group means 
that they have access to justice that they might not have on an individual 
basis and also means that lawyers have additional incentives to pursue 
the suits.131 
Public interest class actions—that is, class actions brought against the 
government for injunctive or declaratory relief, rather than for 
damages132—ensure that the government can be held accountable when it 
                                                   
123. John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23–What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. 
L. REV. 323, 325, 329 (2005). 
124. YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 2 (describing how a class becomes “capable of pressing claims in 
court”); see also id. at 10 (stating that class action litigation “creates power”).  
125. Id. at 2. In Yeazell’s framing, class actions appear to require “bizarre” “compromises with 
individualism.” Id. at 3.  
126. Class action litigation is an equitable exception to the general constitutional principle that an 
individual can only be bound by judgment in a case when he or she is a party to the case in the 
traditional sense. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985); Hansberry, 311 
U.S. at 40; see also YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 2 (explaining that Anglo-American law “exalts 
individual choice” and describing support for the principle that “the individual is the bedrock unit 
both of social action and of legal thought”).  
127. “A class action . . . is an exception to the usual rule that an individual brings a case on his or 
her own behalf,” and, in recognition of the fact that the class action “runs counter to this fundamental 
principle,” Rule 23 “sets out the requirements for when a party can represent others so that efficiency 
and due process are both served.” Suzette M. Malveaux, The Power and Promise of Procedure: 
Examining the Class Action Landscape After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 659, 660 
(2013).  
128. YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 5.  
129. Id. at 8.  
130. See LAHAV, supra note 20, at 121. Class actions “guarantee the equality of individuals against 
large enterprises,” including government. Id. 
131. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3193, 3201 (2013). 
132. Marcus, supra note 14, at 781. 
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fails to follow the law.133 Achieving class certification is important in the 
public interest context because it “protects against mootness, avoids the 
need for multiple claimants to [pursue] their own separate litigation, 
ensures that the scope of the remedy will match . . . violation proved, 
limits a defendant’s ability to resist system-wide enforcement, and 
subjects the plaintiffs to the same preclusive consequences as 
the defendant.”134 
Besides these important results of achieving class certification, this 
Article focuses on public interest class actions for several reasons. First, 
public interest class actions ultimately bring forward powerful individual 
narratives that can move the law forward and that can inform public 
debate. Recent filings in Flores, for instance, have shed light on the 
conditions in which children are living, with searing individual 
information.135 For any of these public interest class actions to get to the 
merits stage, where these powerful stories can be told, the plaintiffs must 
get past class certification. 
The class certification showing requires something unique in terms of 
narrative. Public interest class actions have particular resonance with 
narrative concepts generally; indeed, as described below, a recent 
Supreme Court decision interpreted the rule to require a kind of “glue” 
between the discrete allegations of individual harms suffered, which 
seems to be an implicit call for the kind of narrative that can make 
disparate events hang together.136 
Public interest class actions, because they do not generally involve 
damages, are also clearer subjects for study than actions involving 
damages. When damages are involved, longstanding criticisms of the 
class action, both within the legal system and in the public consciousness, 
may be especially trenchant.137 Some criticisms focus on the economic 
incentives embedded in class actions for money damages: the fact that 
lawyers are entitled to a percentage of the overall recovery in the case can 
mean that class lawyers receive millions even when individual litigants 
                                                   
133. See LAHAV, supra note 20, at 44. 
134. Maureen Carroll, Class Actions, Indivisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99 B.U. L. REV. 59, 74 
(2019); see also Malveaux, supra note 127, at 660 (“Whether an employee can aggregate her case 
with others is . . . a civil rights issue” because it is “an issue of access to justice” (emphasis omitted)). 
135. See supra notes 1–13 and accompanying text.  
136. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011). 
137. “Scholars and judges are torn about the nature of the class action device . . . [as the] result of 
tension between litigant autonomy on the one hand, and the need to solve the collective action problem 
posed by lawsuits that are too small to be fruitfully brought on their own.” Alexandra D. Lahav, The 
Continuum of Aggregation, 53 GA. L. REV. 1393, 1397 (2019); see also YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 
10 (noting that lass action litigation “has received considerable attention because, to a greater extent 
than ordinary litigation, it creates power”).  
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only receive small awards.138 Class actions also receive criticism because 
the all-important certification decision can “blackmail” defendants into 
settling,139 because they subvert individual rights,140 and because the class 
action incentives can encourage lawyers to file suits that lead to distorted 
decisions on the merits.141 
These debates have contributed to deeply entrenched cultural master 
narratives surrounding class action litigation.142 Class action litigation is, 
depending on one’s perspective, an Excalibur that lets the powerless 
enforce their rights against the mighty, a culprit for the resource-draining 
litigation explosion in American courts, and a vehicle for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers’ self-enrichment.143 In fact, there appears to be little empirical 
justification for any specific cultural master narrative.144 
Importantly for this Article’s purposes, the concerns at the heart of 
these master narratives are largely inapplicable to public interest class 
actions.145 When money damages are not at stake, the typical distortions 
                                                   
138. For instance, Robert Klonoff describes “isolated—but highly publicized—instances of abuse 
in which class attorneys obtained handsome fees while class members received meager recoveries or 
worthless coupons.” Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 732 
(2013). During the 1980s and 1990s, “numerous multi-million dollar and billion dollar settlements” 
led to “significant unfavorable press” for the class action device. Id. at 737; see also Alexandra D. 
Lahav, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 993, 995 (2011) (summarizing 
critique of class actions as problematic because “[o]ften [the class action] is a lawsuit run by lawyers 
offering no meaningful compensation to individual litigants”).  
139. LAHAV, supra note 20, at 194 n.27 (summarizing argument that class actions “blackmail” 
defendants into settling, and identifying refutations of that argument). 
140. See also Lahav, supra note 138, at 997 (summarizing argument that “the class action subverts 
individual rights by erasing an individual’s cause of action in favor of the collective”).  
141. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 147 (2011) (“Opponents of class actions argued 
that the form itself produced ‘lemons’—distorting decisions on the merits by giving unfair advantages 
to its users or, more aptly, the lawyers who file suit.”).  
142. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and 
the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979).  
143. For instance, Miller’s early characterization of the competing narratives regarding class action 
divided them into two camps. On the one hand, the valorous class action narrative “trumpeted” the 
procedural device’s ability to “tak[e] care of the smaller guy.” Id. at 665 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). On the other hand, opponents characterized the class action “as a form of legalized blackmail 
or a Frankenstein Monster.” Id.; see also Hensler, supra note 28, at 1604 (“[T]he monster appellation 
connotes something large and out of control . . . .”). 
144. “[T]here is no proof that most class action litigation is meritless . . . .” LAHAV, supra note 20, 
at 126; see also id. (“The trade-off that society must make when deciding whether to restrict class 
actions is between the potential cost . . . of overenforcement and equal justice before the court for 
individuals. Before that trade-off can be reasonably made, there needs to be reliable information about 
the extent of meritless litigation as distinct from the enforcement of existing law. So far, no such 
evidence has been forthcoming.”). 
145. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 795 (“[F]ears about plaintiffs’ lawyers enriching themselves at 
the expense of the class . . . are inapposite in public interest litigation. So are concerns that pressure 
generated by the amount of money at stake will push defendants toward settlements unwarranted by 
the facts and applicable substantive law.”).  
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that give rise to a critique of class actions tend not to be present.146 In the 
public interest class action context, then, there is room to go beyond the 
typical master narratives about class action and analyze the influence of 
other cultural master narratives and of narrative techniques on 
legal  discourse. 
The lack of focus on money damages also allows a stronger focus on 
narrative in class certification decisions and arguments. With classes 
under Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3), there is a greater need to focus on 
requirements of “ascertainability,”147 on notice procedures and 
practicality, and on opt-out procedures. These complications also serve to 
drive up settlement pressures and settled cases can remove narratives from 
public-record court filings.148 On the other hand, Rule 23(b)(2) class 
actions, freed from those concerns, put the focus on issues 
like  commonality.149 
This Article also focuses on public interest class actions because of the 
value generally that legal storytelling places on empathy and 
understanding.150 These values underpin much of law and narrative 
scholarship, and they are reflected in this Article’s use of narrative tools 
to examine public interest class actions. Narrative, like public interest 
class actions, can further human dignity.151 
B. The “Initial Steady State”: Rule 23’s Procedural Framework 
As referenced above, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
governs class actions and provides the basic standards for instituting a 
class action.152 Introduced in 1966, Rule 23 was “a bold and well-
                                                   
146. See id. at 781–82 (“The academic discourse chiefly addresses potential distortions that 
enormous monetary stakes create, an inapposite focus when the plaintiffs want structural reform, not 
money; when ideological commitments, not fees, motivate the plaintiffs’ lawyers; and when 
government defendants, backed by the public fisc, experience risk and internalize cost differently than 
private defendants do.”).  
147. 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1760 (3d ed. 2019) 
(the ascertainability requirement simply means that the class must exist). 
148. See Ralph, supra note 34, at 617–18.  
149. The “commonality requirement has no operative significance in suits for money damages” 
because Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement is a higher threshold than commonality; suits 
under 23(b)(2) do allow a deeper focus on commonality. Marcus, supra note 14, at 785.  
150. See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old 
Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2105 (1989). 
151. Id. at 2106.  
152. Stockholder derivative actions are governed by a separate rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1, as are 
actions brought by or against the members of an unincorporated association as a class, FED. R. 
CIV. P.  23.2. 
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intentioned attempt to encourage more frequent use of class actions.”153 
The drafters of Rule 23 had desegregation in mind when they promulgated 
the rule.154 Indeed, litigation seeking to remedy inequalities and the class 
action rule have always been closely connected.155 
All class actions must meet Rule 23(a)’s threshold requirements: 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.156 
The numerosity requirement protects the interests of members of small 
classes, keeping them from being deprived of their day in court, and  
thwarts attempts to evade joinder.157 The typicality inquiry looks at 
whether the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class 
whose claims they want to litigate and whether those named plaintiffs’ 
interests are the same as the class’s interests.158 The adequacy of 
representation inquiry looks at whether “the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,”159 and 
encompasses both class counsel and representative plaintiffs.160 
For the purposes of this Article, the commonality requirement holds the 
most interest of all the Rule 23(a) threshold requirements. Commonality 
                                                   
153. Charles A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970). “In 1966 the Supreme Court 
promulgated an entirely new Rule 23.” YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 238.  
154.  YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 240–45 (tracing development of modern Rule 23 to “[c]oncerns 
about racial discrimination and consumer and environmental injuries”); Marcus, supra note 14, at 783 
(“Rulemakers had desegregation litigation in mind as they revised Rule 23 in the early 1960s.” 
(footnote omitted)); Resnik, supra note 141, at 84 (“[R]ulemakers fashioned group proceedings to 
give members of racial minorities the ability to seek enforcement of injunctions mandating school 
desegregation and to give consumers claiming statutory rights the capacity to attract lawyers through 
the potential for large monetary recoveries.”); id. at 134 (“One of the rule drafters’ express goals was 
to facilitate access to courts for those who lacked the resources or the knowledge that they had 
possibly been harmed.”).  
155. Marcus, supra note 14, at 783 (“The class action and impact litigation are and always have 
been inseparable.”); Resnik, supra note 141, at 84 (“The 1966 class action rule . . . provides another 
form of intervention to respond to power asymmetries in civil litigation.”); see also Malveaux, supra 
note 127, at 660 (“[O]ne of the most important Supreme Court cases of the twentieth century—Brown 
v. Board of Education—was a class action.”); YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 239 (“[T]he rule endorses 
a strong role for federal courts in social transformation, a role it has played chiefly but not exclusively 
in the context of racial discrimination.”).  
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1442, Westlaw (database 
updated Nov. 2019).  
157. 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1500. , Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019). However, 
the numerosity requirement is applied in a relaxed way when only injunctive relief is at issue. Id. 
158. Id. § 1517, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019).  
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
160. CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1765 (3d ed. 2019) (“If 
the absent members are to be conclusively bound by the result of an action prosecuted or defended by 
a party alleged to represent their interests, basic notions of fairness and justice demand that the 
representation they receive be adequate.”); see also Hensler, supra note 28, at 1600 (noting the 
relationship between the United States justice system and class actions “has always been uneasy, for 
the notion of resolving individual rights and property claims through a representative action on behalf 
of absent parties has always raised due process concerns”).  
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and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are the most “distinctive” 
requirements for a public interest class action.161 By its terms, 
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement asks whether “there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class.”162 Before the Wal-Mart era, 
commonality was understood not to require plaintiffs to surmount a 
particularly high bar.163 In terms of its historical development, the 
commonality requirement is best understood as “no more than a simple 
requirement that there be issues for the court’s determination that would 
arise in the adjudication of each class member’s claims were they litigated 
separately.”164 Commonality ensures that a lawsuit will proceed with a 
shared set of facts and that the same behavior by the defendant can be 
evaluated by hearing all claims at once.165 All of Rule 23(a)’s 
requirements, particularly the commonality requirement, undoubtedly 
restrict how litigants can craft narratives when seeking class certification; 
the impact of so-called “heightened” commonality standard post-Wal-
Mart is addressed in the next Part. 
When the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, section (b) 
authorizes a suit to proceed as a class action when one of its subsections 
is met.166  The choice of which subsection(s) to use to certify a class has 
                                                   
161. Rule 23 imposes two “distinctive requirements” for the certification of injunctive relief classes 
of the kind at issue in public interest litigation: Rule 23(a)’s commonality and Rule 23(b)(2). Marcus, 
supra note 14, at 785.  
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).  
163. Marcus, supra note 14, at 785; see also id. at 786 (“Commonality proved easy to satisfy in 
part because common questions couched at ‘high level[s] of abstraction’ often sufficed.” (quoting 
Marisol A. ex. rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 1997))). 
164. Spencer, supra note 27, at 463; see also id. at 443 (describing how, prior to Wal-Mart, 
commonality “had been seen as relatively easy to satisfy”). For a detailed history of the 23(a)(2) 
commonality requirements, beginning with its roots in English joinder and the Federal Equity Rules 
of 1912, see id. at 449–63 and accompanying notes. 
165. See YEAZELL, supra note 21, at 257; see also Marcus, supra note 14, at 819 (“[C]ommonality 
determines that the class representative and the class members can plausibly link their injuries to the 
same . . . conduct that the substantive law proscribes” and “also ensures that litigation proceeds 
against a relevant factual background.”).  
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). The subsections of Rule 23(b) permit certification of a class in the 
following circumstances: when separate actions involving individual class members would risk 
“inconsistent or varying adjudications” and potentially “establish incompatible standards of conduct 
for the party opposing the class,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A); when separate actions involving 
individual class members would risk being “dispositive of the interests of” others or “would 
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B); 
when a “party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); and when “questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” making a class action 
“superior” as a method “for fairly and efficiently adjudicating” the matter, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
The categories in Rule 23(b) are not mutually exclusive, and courts may certify a class under multiple 
subdivisions of Rule 23(b), although the choice of which subsection(s) to use to certify a class has 
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implications for notice, opt-out rights, and the availability of 
money  damages.167 
The public interest class actions that are the subject of this Article (that 
is, class actions against the government for injunctive or declaratory 
relief) seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2). That rule requires that the 
government actor has “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class” so that one injunction is an appropriate remedy for 
the class as the whole.168 Rule 23(b)(2) was understood to be “an easy 
hurdle” for plaintiffs prior to Wal-Mart.169 As explained in the next 
section, the Supreme Court also gave this requirement sharper teeth in 
Wal-Mart by writing that a Rule 23(b)(2) class has to have 
an  “indivisible” remedy.170 
The class certification decision is the most important point in the class 
action lawsuit.171 Once a class is certified, Rule 23(d) grants a judge much 
broader discretion to determine the course of the action.172 Class 
certification is vital for plaintiffs pursuing claims against the government 
for enforcement of civil rights, as class certification keeps defendants 
from mooting individual claims through piecemeal actions and allows 
plaintiffs to ensure broad-ranging relief.173 As well, certification of a class 
                                                   
implications for notice, opt-out rights, and the availability of money damages. 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS §§ 4:3, 4:4 (5th ed.).  
167. For instance, 23(b)(2) class actions generally may not result in monetary relief. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) (holding that claims for monetary relief may not be 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2), “at least where . . . the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive 
or declaratory relief”).  
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  
169. Marcus, supra note 14, at 788. 
170. See supra section II.C; Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360. This section focuses on the pressures that 
Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) place on narratives. The other parts of Rule 23 may also exert pressure on 
the kinds of class member stories that are told in class action litigation. For instance, Rule 23(c) 
establishes the procedure for certifying a class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). Importantly, the “class must be 
defined” at a level more precise than simply “all those injured by defendant’s actions,” or “all those 
wishing to engage in certain types of activity.” Richard Marcus, Revolution v. Evolution in Class 
Action Reform, 325 F.R.D. 1301, 1322 (2018) (“It does not suffice for a court to certify a class of ‘all 
those similarly situated’ to the plaintiff. One must explain what similarity suffices.”). 
171. See Klonoff, supra note 138, at 746 (“[T]he class certification decision is the defining moment 
in a class action.”); Spencer, supra note 27, at 442 (“The class certification decision is one of the most 
hard-fought battles in civil litigation.”). 
172. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d); see also George Rutherglen, The Problem with Procedure: Some 
Inconvenient Truths About Aspirational Goals, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 21 (2019) (“[O]nce 
additional parties are before the court, their presence calls for the exercise of increased judicial 
management. In class actions under Rule 23, the judge has broad authority over the conduct of the 
action, appointment of class counsel, and approval of settlements.”).  
173. Carroll, supra note 134, at 62 (“Class treatment can have a significant effect on this type of 
case; without it, the case might become moot before the merits can be adjudicated, or the relief might 
be limited to a single [plaintiff].”). 
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creates serious pressure on defendants to settle.174 Indeed, “most class 
actions settle.”175 
Most importantly for this Article, once a class has been certified, the 
narrative possibilities of a case open. As the case proceeds, the plaintiffs 
are no longer concerned with demonstrating commonality and the other 
requirements for certification, but rather can elicit and include more 
detailed and persuasive stories. While it may be argued that group 
litigation can erase individual litigant voices,176 it is also true that once a 
class is certified, individual plaintiffs can participate by sharing their 
stories.177 For instance, Alexandra Lahav has highlighted the example of 
the 1980s litigation, brought as a class action on behalf of Vietnam 
veterans against manufacturers of the chemical Agent Orange.178 When 
the case settled as a class action, Judge Jack Weinstein held “town hall 
forums” at which affected veterans could, among other things, share their 
stories.179 This process enabled individual veterans to participate in the 
litigation, “even though that participation did not involve them getting 
their own day in court.”180 
Moreover, class actions can give individual class members “a structure 
and a language for debating and deliberating together” about the issues in 
the case and their broader social impact.181 The narratives generated in 
class actions can also inform broader public understanding of the issues 
in a case.182 
As well, for class members, once a class is certified, participation in 
litigation offers important benefits, including participation in self-
government.183 Indeed, participation is a “promise” of our legal system, 
embodied in the concept “that each person will have his or her day in 
                                                   
174. Klonoff, supra note 138, at 733, 738 (“Because of the high stakes, defendants often felt 
compelled to settle large class actions rather than risk a potentially bankrupting judgment.”). 
175. Lahav, supra note 137, at 1397. 
176. LAHAV, supra note 20, at 91 (“[W]hen large numbers of plaintiffs are lumped together through 
a variety of procedures, individuals can be lost in the shuffle, without a voice in their 
own  lawsuit . . . .”). 
177. See id. at 92 (“[I]n a class action where there is a trial, individuals can participate 
as  witnesses . . . .”).  
178. Id. at 93–94.  
179. Id. at 93. 
180. Id. at 93–94. 
181. Id. at 92–93.  
182. “[T]he high profile nature of some class actions and other aggregate litigation also means that 
the information is publicized more readily than in individual litigation, which might receive less 
attention.” Lahav, supra note 131, at 3199; see also LAHAV, supra note 20, at 67–68 (explaining how 
class action lawsuits against Swiss banks for retaining funds of Holocaust victims enabled “the 
formulation and dissemination of narratives that would not have been heard otherwise”).   
183. LAHAV, supra note 20, at 84 (“Litigation serves the democratic value of participation by 
enabling individuals to engage directly in the process of lawmaking and law enforcement.”). 
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court.”184 The value of individual participation in self-government 
through litigation is particularly great when civil rights claims are 
at  issue.185 
Having set this scene, the next section turns to a recent Supreme Court 
decision that complicates the story for public interest class actions. As the 
next section describes, despite not being itself a public interest class 
action, Wal-Mart foretold a profound impact on public interest 
class  actions. 
C. “Disrupted by a Trouble”: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 
As this section describes, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the 
Supreme Court heightened the “commonality” requirement.186 For this 
reason, the Court’s opinion garnered significant criticism. As a narrative-
theory reading of the opinion shows, powerful stock stories and master 
narratives can be excavated underlying the opinion. 
1. The Supreme Court Redefines Commonality 
The Wal-Mart plaintiffs were current and former female employees of 
Wal-Mart, who alleged that Wal-Mart discriminated against them in 
violation of Title VII.187 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the broad 
discretion that Wal-Mart entrusted to supervisors at local Wal-Mart 
outposts—discretion over pay and promotions—led to an unlawful 
disparate impact on female employees.188 The case presented “one of the 
most expansive class actions ever,” with the class “comprising about one 
and a half million plaintiffs.”189 
Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion decisions were characterized by “broad 
discretion” that was “generally committed to local managers” and 
“exercised in a largely subjective manner.”190 Thus, in their Title VII 
claims, rather than alleging an “express corporate policy against the 
                                                   
184. Id. at 88. 
185. Id. at 84 (“[W]hen a citizen sues the government . . . ordinary individuals, even those without 
many resources or political connections, can call government representatives into court to explain and 
be held accountable for unjust practices.”). 
186. Spencer, supra note 27, at 445.  
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1 et seq. (2012). 
188. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345–46 (2011); see also id. (“The basic theory 
of their case is that a strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ permits bias against women to infect, 
perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of 
managers—thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory 
practice.”).  
189. Id. at 342.  
190. Id. at 343. 
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advancement of women,” the plaintiffs alleged that the broad discretion 
vested in local managers led “to an unlawful disparate impact on 
[women]” and that Wal-Mart’s continued provision of such discretion, 
combined with its awareness of the resulting impact on women, amounted 
to disparate treatment.191 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory 
relief as well as back pay and punitive damages.192 
The district court certified a class under Rule 23(b)(2).193 A divided en 
banc Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s class certification, holding, 
among other things, that the plaintiffs had met the commonality 
requirement by raising “the common question whether Wal–Mart’s 
female employees nationwide were subjected to a single set of corporate 
policies (not merely a number of independent discriminatory  acts).”194 
The Supreme Court reversed, determining both that certification of the 
plaintiffs’ claims for back pay was not proper under Rule 23(b)(2) and 
that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the commonality required under 
Rule 23(a) for a class to be certified.195 In so doing, the Court 
“redefin[ed]  commonality.”196 
The Court unanimously agreed that the plaintiffs’ claims for back pay 
were improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2).197 The Court held that 
claims for monetary relief could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) 
where “the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or 
declaratory relief.”198 In its opinion as to Rule 23(b)(2), the Court invoked 
the concept of “indivisibility,” explaining that “[t]he key to the (b)(2) class 
is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy 
warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or 
declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none 
of  them.’”199 
                                                   
191. Id. at 344–45. 
192. Id. at 342. 
193. Id. at 347.  
194. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 612 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted). 
195. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367. 
196. Spencer, supra note 27, at 444. 
197. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360. 
198. Id. In other words, Rule 23(b)(2) simply does not authorize class certification when each 
plaintiff would be entitled to an individualized award. Id. The Court explained that claims that involve 
individual money damages “belong in Rule 23(b)(3),” with its accompanying procedural protections 
such as “mandatory notice, and the right to opt out.” Id. at 362. 
199. Id. at 360. The Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision used the term “indivisible” for the first 
time in a published federal opinion to describe the requirement for the class certification under 
23(b)(2). Carroll, supra note 134, at 63. For a historical account of the development of “indivisibility” 
as a requirement for 23(b)(2) class actions, including in the scholarship of Professor Richard 
Nagareda, see id. at 68–71 (“[T]he term [indivisibility] did not appear out of nowhere.”).  
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The Court split five to four on the question whether the plaintiffs 
satisfied the commonality requirement set out in Rule 23(a)(2).200 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate the existence of a common question of law or fact.201 
The Court held that commonality requires something more from the 
plaintiffs than demonstrating “merely that they have all suffered a 
violation of the same provision of law.”202 The plaintiffs’ claims must 
depend on a “common contention” that is “of such a nature that it is 
capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its 
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each 
one of the claims in one stroke.”203 In other words, commonality requires 
that the court “believe that all [plaintiffs’] claims can productively be 
litigated at once.”204 
The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart engaged in a pattern or practice of 
discrimination, leading to “literally millions of employment decisions.”205 
To demonstrate commonality in such circumstances, Justice Scalia wrote 
that the plaintiffs would need to provide more “glue,” in the form of good 
reasons to believe all the class members’ claims would “produce a 
common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”206 The 
“glue”—which would hold together disparate individual experiences—
would have to fill the “conceptual gap” between one individual claim of 
injury based on alleged discrimination, and “the existence of a class of 
persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual.”207 
The Court suggested some ways to “bridge” that “conceptual gap”208—
for instance, demonstrating that the employer used biased evaluation 
practices, or demonstrating that the employer operated “‘under a general 
policy of discrimination.’”209 But the Court noted that the “only corporate 
policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly establishe[d]” was that 
                                                   
200. See Carroll, supra note 134, at 85–86 (noting that the Court agreed on the Rule 23(b)(2) 
holding as to individualized damages claims for backpay, but the majority and the dissent disagreed—
by a margin of five to four—whether the putative class satisfied commonality). 
201. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359. 
202. Id. at 350. 
203. Id.  
204. Id. Spencer has explained the way that Wal-Mart embodies an efficiency requirement. 
Spencer, supra note 27, at 474. 
205. 564 U.S. at 352.  
206. Id. “Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those [employment] decisions 
together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will 
produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.” Id. 
207. Id. at 353 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–58 (1982) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15 (alterations added)). 
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Wal-Mart “allow[ed] discretion by local supervisors over employment 
matters”—quite “the opposite” of commonality.210 Though discretion in 
employment matters can be the basis for a disparate treatment claim, more 
would be required; the Court found it simply “quite unbelievable that all 
managers would exercise their discretion in a common way without some 
common direction.”211 
The Court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had not provided the 
“glue” that would hold together all the reasons behind the unfavorable 
employment consequences they suffered; thus, the plaintiffs could not 
meet commonality. 
Dissenting from the Court’s holding on commonality, Justice Ginsburg 
wrote that the majority had misread Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality 
requirement to contain “concerns properly addressed in a Rule 23(b)(3) 
assessment.”212 Justice Ginsburg wrote that, properly understood, the 
commonality requirement posed a lower bar than the one the majority set 
in its opinion; as a “threshold criterion,” Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality 
requirement was meant to be “easily satisfied,” she explained.213 
Justice Ginsburg characterized the Court’s approach as overly focused 
on “dissimilarities,” writing that the Court’s attention was 
“train[ed] . . . on what distinguishes individual class members, rather than 
on what unites them.”214 Looking at what united the putative class 
members, Justice Ginsburg would have given “credence to the key dispute 
common to the class,” namely, “whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay 
and promotion policies are discriminatory.”215 
2. “Efforts at Redress”: Critiques of Wal-Mart 
Commentators quickly recognized that Wal-Mart stood to effect 
significant changes in class action procedure.216 They largely agreed that 
                                                   
210. Id. at 355. 
211. Id. at 356. In addition to treating as uncompelling the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence related to 
gender discrimination, the Court concluded that what it called the plaintiffs’ “anecdotal” evidence 
was “too weak to raise any inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel decisions are 
discriminatory.” Id. at 358. By the sheer numbers, the plaintiffs filed 120 affidavits describing 
experiences of discrimination—“about 1 for every 12,500 class members.” Id.   
212. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 368 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
213. Id. at 375 (citing 5 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.23[2], at 23–72 
(3d  ed. 2011)). 
214. Id. at 377. 
215. Id. at 374. The majority’s focus on dissimilarities, Justice Ginsburg wrote, “mimic[ked] the 
Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry into whether common questions ‘predominate’ over individual issues.” Id. at 
376. Justice Ginsburg also wrote that the evidence the plaintiffs had put forward at the district court 
would have adequately satisfied 23(a)(2)’s demands. Id. at 374. 
216. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 14, at 790 (Wal-Mart “entrenched several changes that have 
unsettled the procedural regulation of the public interest class action.”). The case was an unusual 
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the requirement for “commonality” had been heightened,217 though there 
was little clarity about the historical and doctrinal roots for the heightened 
requirement.218 
The strongest criticisms of Wal-Mart focused on its practical effects: 
critics warned that the opinion would make class certification more 
difficult219 and would have an especially devastating impact on 
discrimination claims.220 They predicted the heightened commonality 
standard would benefit the powerful at the expense of plaintiffs in public 
interest litigation.221 There was also concern that the Court’s language 
allowing lower courts to inquire into the merits of a claim as part of the 
class certification inquiry would drive up the costs of litigation for the 
plaintiffs and discourage claims.222 
                                                   
vehicle for a change to class action procedure that would have such an impact on public interest 
litigation. Marcus notes that Wal-Mart, though it involved a putative class action under Rule 23(b)(2), 
was decidedly not a public interest class action—in fact, it involved “huge financial stakes.” Id. at 
790 (“[T]he case had little to do with policy concerns that public interest litigation might raise.”); see 
also id. at 792 (“[N]othing in the opinion or even in the copious merits filings with the Court exhibit 
the slightest concern with the sort of distinctive policy concerns that structural reform 
litigation  triggers.”). 
217. See, e.g., Klonoff, supra note 138, at 774 (“The Supreme Court’s . . . decision appears to have 
given new meaning to commonality.”); Spencer, supra note 27, at 444 (explaining that the Court in 
Wal-Mart “redefin[ed] commonality.”). 
218. The heightened commonality standard also drew criticism for causing (or reflecting) doctrinal 
confusion. The Court’s apparent grafting of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement onto the 
commonality inquiry “injects confusion over what is required to satisfy each element of 23(a) and 
(b).” Klonoff, supra note 138, at 764; see also id. at 778 (theorizing that Wal-Mart could “effectively 
impos[e] a predominance requirement where the drafters of Rule 23 chose not to include one”). Critics 
have also argued that the opinion “cannot be squared with the text, structure or history” of the 
commonality requirement set out in Rule 23(a)(2). Id. at 776; see also Spencer, supra note 27, at 444 
(“Nothing in the language or history of Rule 23(a)(2) supports the . . . majority’s 
interpretation  of  it.”).  
219. Critics predicted that Wal-Mart would make commonality “a standard part of a defendant’s 
attack on class certification.” Klonoff, supra note 138, at 779.  
220. In particular, the Wal-Mart decision “heightens entry standards in the context of 
discrimination claims, a type of claim that historically has been treated as disfavored, particularly 
when advanced by members of outgroups.” Spencer, supra note 27, at 479. 
221. In Wal-Mart, “the Court drew a boundary line that favors large, powerful employers over 
everyday workers alleging systemic discrimination.” Malveaux, supra note 127, at 661. Spencer has 
argued that the Wal-Mart majority’s redefinition of commonality rested on “claimant animus, 
combined with hostility toward and a misunderstanding of claims of discrimination.” Spencer, supra 
note 27, at 445. There is evidence that some lower courts have followed the more rigorous Wal-Mart 
approach to class certification. See id. at 445–46 (giving examples of “lower courts taking the 
heightened commonality approach to heart”). The heightened standard has also caused courts some 
concern. Klonoff, supra note 138, at 755 (“Several judges and commentators have expressed concern 
about imposing this high burden on plaintiffs at the class certification phase.”); see also id. at 755 
n.152 (giving examples of expressions of concern). Other commentators suggest that “Wal-Mart’s 
impact on class certification has not been as dire as predicted.” Linda Mullenix, Is the Arc of 
Procedure Bending Towards Injustice?, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 611, 647 (2019). 
222. In Wal-Mart, the Court also rejected the proposition that courts cannot rigorously examine the 
evidence before them, which may touch on the merits. By authorizing some level of inquiry into the 
merits at the class certification phase, the opinion also requires more proof at certification, which 
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Critics have linked the Wal-Mart decision to the Court’s larger shift 
towards procedures that are hostile to individual claimants, especially 
those from social outgroups, and to claims of civil rights.223  Such 
procedural developments have been termed “restrictive procedure.”224 As 
defined by A. Benjamin Spencer, “restrictive procedural doctrines are 
those reflective of a bias against claimants from societal outgroups 
asserting disfavored claims against members of the dominant class.”225 
Restrictive procedure tends “to keep cases out of court or dismiss them 
immediately without giving the participants a chance to develop their 
proofs and arguments.”226 When courts, legislators, and rulemakers 
restrict the ability to bring lawsuits, the burden of these changes tends “to 
fall more on individuals than organizations, and more on cases implicating 
broad social questions than on cases of only individual concern.”227 
Class actions have not escaped these creeping restrictive trends.228 In 
fact, restrictive procedure is particularly problematic when it comes to 
class actions, because of the important power imbalance that class actions 
                                                   
“raises the cost of certification and diminishes the chance of successful certification.” Spencer, supra 
note 27, 478; see also Resnik, supra note 141, at 149 (“This part of the Court’s ruling imposed a 
heightened standard of proof at the certification stage that undercut the Court’s prior law, which had 
been read to instruct trial judges not to go deeply into the merits when ruling on certification.”); 
Klonoff, supra note 138, at 731 (noting how courts require plaintiffs to “put forward considerably 
more evidentiary proof at the class certification stage than ever before,” including requiring plaintiffs 
to “prove major portions of their cases on the merits”). Allowing inquiry into the merits imposes 
additional burdens on plaintiffs with limited resources: “More inquiry into the merits of a case means 
more expensive and time-consuming discovery at the class certification phase.” Malveaux, supra note 
127, at 670; see also id. (discussing how in Wal-Mart the Supreme Court confirmed that some of the 
merits questions, to the extent they overlap with class certification issues, will be relevant, “the extent 
to which the merits should be considered and the amount of proof necessary at class certification stage 
is still being debated”).  
223. Spencer, supra note 27, at 448 (noting how Wal-Mart “is also disquieting in light of the 
Court’s other recent decisions trending in the direction of restricting access to justice by making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring claims and have them heard”); see also LAHAV, supra note 20, at 
9 (“[T]he ability of litigation to promote fundamental values is quickly eroding.”).  
224. Spencer, supra note 24, at 476.  
225. Id.  
226. LAHAV, supra note 20, at 21. The developments may also stem from the opinion that there is 
too much litigation taxing the court system: “Federal judges have stated explicitly that there are too 
many cases and have developed doctrines to cull cases early and often.” Id. 
227. Id.; see also Lahav, supra note 138, at 1009 (arguing that “the laws that undo our rights 
piecemeal,” including as “the ordinary procedural rules that limit access to justice” and “silently limit 
people’s ability to vindicate their rights, particularly their civil rights,” are “wrong as a 
policy  matter”). 
228. LAHAV, supra note 20, at 126; see also Klonoff, supra note 138, at 731 (describing how the 
class action has “fallen into disfavor” as “courts have become skeptical about certifying class 
actions”). Wal-Mart is not the only instance of restrictive class action procedure; the restrictive trend 
is also on display in the court’s jurisprudence on class action waivers. See Mullenix, supra note 221, 
at 622–23 (“[T]he Court’s rulings on class action waivers are construed as part of the Court’s pro-
corporate, anti-plaintiff bias . . . . Since 2010, the Court has upheld mandatory arbitration clauses and 
class action waivers in five decisions.”). 
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can correct229 and because of the important rights that class actions, 
including public interest class actions, vindicate.230 
3. “Efforts at Transformation”: A Narrative Reading of Wal-Mart 
Narrative theory provides an additional locus for examining the Court’s 
opinions in Wal-Mart. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion, particularly with respect to the commonality 
question, can be read in a narrative light. Parsing the discussions of 
commonality serves to demonstrate the power that stock stories and 
master narratives can have in the class action context.231 
The majority and Justice Ginsburg fall on different sides of recognizing 
what this Article calls the “unconscious bias” master narrative, and of 
recognizing the Wal-Mart plaintiffs’ experiences as instances of that 
narrative.232 The “unconscious bias” master narrative describes situations 
like the ones the Wal-Mart plaintiffs alleged they experienced: where a 
decision-maker exercises discretion and makes decisions that favor one 
group and disfavor another group, based on unexamined but powerful 
biases.233 As with all master narratives, the audience’s ability to 
understand and recognize the underlying “unconscious bias” master 
narrative as underlying any individual set of events will depend on the 
stories with which the audience is already familiar. 
As a narrative reading demonstrates, the majority simply could not (or 
would not) recognize a master narrative about discretionary decision-
making leading almost certainly to discriminatory decisions. Justice 
Scalia’s opinion concluded that evidence of discrimination was “entirely 
absent,”234 meaning that it would be “quite unbelievable” that all 
                                                   
229. Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494, 1498 
(2013) (“Current developments of class action doctrine . . . are reinforcing in the courtroom the 
asymmetry that exists between individual plaintiffs and organizational defendants outside 
litigation.”).  
230. LAHAV, supra note 20, at 24 (“When the barriers to class certification are too high, important 
cases . . . never reach the merits or are delayed too long.”).  
231. The parties in Wal-Mart themselves resembled the characters in an archetypal David-against-
Goliath master narrative. As Judith Resnik wrote, “[h]ad the litigants appeared in a novel, reviewers 
would have protested that they were clichés.” Resnik, supra note 141, at 93.  
232. Spencer outlines Wal-Mart in terms of what we might understand as a master narrative or 
stock script: the “doubt-of-group-bias perspective.” Spencer, supra note 27, at 483. He describes the 
majority decision as evincing “serious doubts about the existence of group bias within an organization 
that is pervasive, cultural, and unconscious or condoned – but not always express.” Id. In turn, that 
stock story “yielded a disbelief that important commonalities could exist, since discrimination is 
personal and must be detected on a case-by-case basis absent a formal, global policy.” Id.  
233. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 480 (“The . . . plaintiffs also sought to challenge implicit gender 
bias that manifested itself through the policy of excessive subjective decisionmaking with respect to 
pay and promotion decisions.”).  
234. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 353 (2011).  
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managers in a corporate structure and culture like Wal-Mart’s “would 
exercise their discretion in a common way without some common 
direction.”235 He wrote that because the managers’ avowed reasoning for 
their decisions might differ, the plaintiffs’ individual narratives could not 
be read as multiple instances of a similar narrative.236 Scalia’s opinion 
implies that the majority found the plaintiffs’ narratives incomplete in 
terms of narrative coherence—their allegations of delegated discretion left 
empty gaps that meant they fell short of telling a complete tale of 
discrimination—and faulty in terms of narrative correspondence—the 
plaintiffs failed the test of whether a story fits with the audience’s 
normative sense of what happens in the world. 
Justice Ginsburg, on the other hand, credited the “unconscious bias” 
master narrative. Her opinion alludes to a stock script or schema with 
which she was familiar; she recognized that “[m]anagers, like all 
humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are unaware.”237 Thus, 
she found that the plaintiffs’ stories were coherent—complete and 
internally consistent—and that they corresponded with the way the world 
ordinarily works. Unlike the majority, Justice Ginsburg recognized the 
stock scripts and legal master narratives at the core of the plaintiffs’ 
claims, writing that “[t]he practice of delegating to supervisors large 
discretion to make personnel decisions, uncontrolled by formal standards, 
has long been known to have the potential to produce disparate effects.”238 
She recognized the plaintiffs’ allegations as resembling a canonical 
master narrative of discrimination, “one of the prototypical cases in this 
area.”239 She also noted that the Court had already recognized stories 
involving discretionary employment practices as narratives of Title VII 
violations before, “not only when such practices are motivated by 
discriminatory intent but also when they produce discriminatory 
results.”240 She also gave an example of an earlier instance of the 
unconscious bias master narrative.241 
Reading Wal-Mart through a narrative lens demonstrates that the 
commonality question can be understood as asking whether the narrative 
offered by the plaintiffs possesses narrative coherence and narrative 
correspondence, particularly when considered in light of potentially 
                                                   
235. Id. at 356. 
236. See id. at 357. Malveaux has written about the majority’s deep skepticism of evidence that 
discrimination was at work in the Wal-Mart corporate culture. Malveaux, supra note 127, at 662. 
More broadly, Spencer has written that jurists who disfavor discrimination claims “do so because they 
do not believe in them.” Spencer, supra note 27, at 480.  
237. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 372–73. 
238. Id. at 372. 
239. Id. at 373 (citing Leisner v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 359, 364–65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)). 
240. Id. 
241. See id. at 373 n.6. 
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applicable master narratives. Now that the Court has made the 
commonality standard harder to meet, prospective plaintiffs in public 
interest class actions faced a difficult narrative puzzle: how to craft a story 
to satisfy the class certification requirements. 
As the next Part illustrates, in order to comply with the procedural 
complexities inherent in class action, and in order to navigate the newly 
heightened commonality threshold under Wal-Mart, successful class 
actions use narrative tools and create narrative effects in ways not 
observed in traditional litigation. This subject—how advocates use 
narrative tools to achieve certain effects at the class certification phase—
has not been studied comprehensively. This next Part begins to fill that 
gap in the literature. 
III. CLASS STORIES IN ACTION: NARRATIVES PRIOR TO 
CERTIFICATION 
In addition to the procedural complexities that class actions pose for 
scholars of procedure, the class action also presents an interesting subject 
for narrative study. The procedural hurdles a class must overcome to be 
recognized require some level of conformity among individual class 
member narratives—quintessential “narrative-erasing” procedure.242 
Class actions represent at some level a combining of distinct, individual 
narratives—the artifacts with which narrative studies in the law are often 
so concerned—into one, shared, communal story for the purposes of 
seeking legal redress. 
On a narrative level, a fundamental tension exists between the 
expression of individual stories in litigation as a mechanism for advancing 
law and public discourse, and the procedural tool of the class action as a 
means for advancing rights and securing redress for particularly powerless 
groups. This tension mirrors the underlying theoretical tension in class 
actions and group litigation generally: the compromise between 
individuality and collective vision.243 
To illustrate the unique uses of narrative tools and the careful 
calibration of narrative effects at work in class action certification efforts, 
this section conducts a critical reading and analysis of two recent public 
interest class actions: Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement244 and J.D. v. Azar.245 
                                                   
242. See Ralph, supra note 34, at 575.   
243. See supra notes 124–131 and accompanying text.  
244. No. 3:18-cv-00428, 2018 WL 8665001, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2018) (granting motion for 
class certification in part). 
245. 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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The following sections provide important background on the legal 
proceedings in the Ms. L. and J.D. cases; offer descriptive observations 
about the way narrative techniques are used to help inform class 
certification decisions; and finally, make recommendations to courts and 
advocates regarding narrative in public interest class actions before 
certification. 
A. Two Recent Public Interest Class Actions 
Before identifying the way advocates in these cases used narrative, the 
Article provides summaries of the cases’ underlying facts and procedural 
histories. Both the Ms. L. and J.D. cases resulted in successful certification 
of the relevant classes. As well, both cases involve minors in immigration 
custody (similar to the Flores litigation discussed in the Introduction of 
this Article), but concern very different key facts and causes of action: 
Ms. L. involved the separation of parents and children at the U.S. border. 
J.D. involved the rights of unaccompanied minors in immigration custody 
to access abortion care. 
As described below, the cases provide rich ground for the application 
of narrative analysis. Both present situations where a compelling, detailed, 
personal narrative might be especially persuasive to a non-legal audience. 
Yet the narratives developed in this case do not take on the form one might 
expect. The contrast between the potential for a powerfully told story and 
the minimal narratives that are required to comply with the strict 
requirements for class certification provides an important perspective on 
the way narrative tools can be used to inform class certification decisions. 
1. Ms. L. v. ICE: Challenging Family Separations at the Border 
Ms. L. arose out of the government practice during the summer of 2018 
of separating migrant families and placing their children in facilities for 
unaccompanied minors.246 The case asserted claims for violation of due 
                                                   
246. See Ms. L., 2018 WL 866500, at *1–*3 (granting motion for class certification in part). 
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process,247 for violation of federal statutes governing asylum,248 and for 
violations of the Administrative Procedure Act.249 
The case began with one plaintiff: Ms. L., a resident of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, fled Congo with her seven-year-old daughter.250 
As Judge Sabraw of the Southern District of California later described it, 
Ms. L. “did everything right.”251 She and her child arrived lawfully at a 
port of entry along the southern United States border, and Ms. L. requested 
asylum in her limited Spanish.252 She was detained with her child for 
several days, but then she and her daughter were later forcibly separated; 
Ms. L. was held in San Diego while her asylum claims proceeded, and her 
daughter was sent to a facility in Chicago.253 
A few weeks after Ms. L.’s claim was filed, her attorneys filed an 
amended complaint, adding another named plaintiff, Ms. C., and 
including class action allegations.254 The plaintiffs simultaneously moved 
for class certification.255 The second named plaintiff, Ms. C., had a 
different story—as the court later noted, “Ms. C., by contrast, did not do 
everything right.”256 Ms. C. came to the United States from Brazil, and 
she brought her fourteen-year-old son.257 Although she made an asylum 
claim, she was arrested and convicted of entering the country illegally (a 
                                                   
247. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7–
8, Ms. L., 331 F.R.D. 529 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD) [hereinafter Ms. L. 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint] (alleging liberty interest under the Due Process 
Clause in “remaining together as a family” and alleging the separation of families violates substantive 
and procedural due process); see also Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief with 
Class Action Allegations at 11, Ms. L., 331 F.R.D. 529 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-
MDD) [hereinafter Ms. L. Amended Complaint] (alleging due process claim).  
248. See Ms. L. Amended Complaint, supra note 247 at 8 (alleging family separation violates 
federal asylum law because it impedes the ability to pursue asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012)); 
see also id. at 11–12 (same).  
249. See Ms. L. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint, supra note 247 at 8 (alleging 
family separation is arbitrary and capricious, violating the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706 (2012)); see also Ms. L. Amended Complaint, supra note 247 at 11 (same). 
250. See Ms. L. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint, supra note 247 at 1. 
251. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 
252. See Ms. L. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint, supra note 247 at 1. 
253. Id. 
254. See Ms. L. Amended Complaint, supra note 247 at 1. 
255. Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification at 1, Ms. L., 331 F.R.D. 529 (S.D. Cal. 
2018) (No. 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD) [hereinafter Ms. L. Notice of Motion and Motion for Class 
Certification]. The plaintiffs sought certification of a class defined as follows: “[a]ll adult parents 
nationwide who (1) are or will be detained in immigration custody by the Department of Homeland 
Security, and (2) have a minor child who is or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in 
ORR custody, absent a demonstration in a hearing that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the 
child.” Id.  
256. Ms. L., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1164. 
257. Ms. L. Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification, supra note 255, Exhibit 12, at 1–
2 [hereinafter Restricted Declaration of Ms. C.] (Restricted Declaration of Ms. C.).  
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misdemeanor) and she was separated from her son while serving a twenty-
five-day criminal sentence.258 When Ms. C. was released, she was held in 
immigration detention, and remained separated from her son.259 
As the case continued,260 the plaintiffs’ counsel introduced declarations 
from immigration attorneys—telling stories about what the attorneys had 
seen in terms of family separations.261 Later, along with the reply in 
support of the motion for class certification, the plaintiffs’ counsel 
attached additional declarations, including narratives from asylum 
seekers—some very short and fairly boilerplate, and some with 
more  detail.262 
Ultimately, the Southern District of California granted in large part the 
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, certifying a class of 
the  following: 
[a]ll adult parents who enter the United States at or between 
designated ports of entry who (1) have been, are, or will be 
detained in immigration custody by the DHS, and (2) have a 
minor child who is or will be separated from them by DHS and 
detained in ORR custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody, 
absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger 
to the child.263 
On the same day the court certified the class, it also granted the 
plaintiffs’ motion for a class-wide preliminary injunction, enjoining 
defendants from detaining class members “without and apart from their 
minor children, absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents 
a danger to the child” and from “continuing to detain the minor children 
of the Class Members” after the class members’ release from DHS 
custody.264 The injunction further ordered defendants to reunify class 
                                                   
258. See Ms. L. Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification, supra note 255, at 4.  
259. See Restricted Declaration of Ms. C., supra note 257, at 2.  
260. While the plaintiffs’ class certification motion was pending, the district court granted in part 
a motion to dismiss the Administrative Procedure Act and asylum claims but denied the motion to 
dismiss as to the plaintiffs’ due process claim. Ms. L., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1168.  
261. Ms. L. Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification, supra note 255 at Exhibit 14, at 
1–2 (Declaration of Mayra Jiminez); Ms. L. Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification, 
supra note 255, at Exhibit 15, at 1–3 (Declaration of Shalyn Fluharty).   
262. Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification, Ms. L., 331 F.R.D. 529 (No. 
3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD), 2018 WL 8665001.  
263. Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 9, Ms. L., 331 F.R.D. 529 
(No. 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD). The certified class excluded migrant parents with criminal history 
or communicable disease, as well as those who were in the interior of the United States or were subject 
to an Executive Order intended to “maintain family unity” by “keeping migrant families together 
during criminal and immigration proceedings to the extent permitted by law.” Id. at 2, 9 n.10 (citing 
Donald J. Trump, Executive Order, Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family 
Separation  § 1, 2018 WL 3046068 (June 20, 2018)).  
264. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 
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members with their children and to facilitate communication between 
class members and children.265 
2. J.D. v. Azar: Challenging the Denial of Abortion Care to Pregnant 
Unaccompanied Minors in Immigration Custody 
J.D. v. Azar involved unaccompanied minors without lawful 
immigration status who were being held in federal custody—in particular, 
those unaccompanied minors in federal custody who were pregnant and 
wished to terminate their pregnancies.266 On its merits, the case concerned 
the constitutionality of a federal government policy, instituted in 2017, 
under which “any unaccompanied alien child in its custody” was 
“effectively barr[ed] . . . from obtaining a pre-viability abortion.”267  The 
case asserted claims for violations of the Fifth Amendment right to 
privacy and liberty,268 for freedom of speech violations,269 for 
informational privacy violations,270 and for Establishment 
Clause  violations.271 
As with Ms. L., the case began with the story of a single individual: 
plaintiff Rochelle Garza (a pseudonym) initially brought a lawsuit on 
behalf of one unaccompanied minor—Jane Doe (“J.D.”), for whom Garza 
served as guardian ad litem—as well as a proposed class of others 
                                                   
265. Id. 
266. J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The case was initiated as “Garza v. 
Hargan.” See Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages (Interference with minor’s constitutional 
right to obtain an abortion) at 1–2, Garza v. Hargan, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-
02122) (D.D.C. 2017) [hereinafter Garza Complaint]. 
267. J.D., 925 F.3d at 1299.  
268. See Garza Complaint, supra note 266, at 12–13 (alleging “Defendants violate unaccompanied 
immigrant minors’ right to privacy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment by wielding a veto power 
over their abortion decisions, and obstructing, interfering with, or blocking access to abortion, 
including by forcing minors to visit crisis pregnancy centers and preventing them from going to 
medical facilities where they can obtain legal abortions”); see also Second Amended Complaint for 
Injunctive Relief (Interference with Minors’ Constitutional Right to Obtain an Abortion) at 15–16, 
Garza, 925 F.3d 1291 (No. 1:17-cv-02122) [hereinafter Garza Second Amended Complaint].  
269. See Garza Complaint, supra note 266, at 13 (alleging that defendants “compelled 
unaccompanied minors to discuss their decisions to have abortions and the circumstances surrounding 
those decisions with crisis pregnancy centers” and others, violating the right against compelled 
speech); Garza Second Amended Complaint, supra note 268, at 16.  
270. See Garza Complaint, supra note 266, at 13 (alleging that defendants violated “minors’ rights 
to informational privacy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment” by requiring them “to disclose their 
identities, their pregnancies, and their decisions to seek or have an abortion”); Garza Second 
Amended Complaint, supra note 268, at 16 (same). 
271. See Garza Complaint, supra note 266, at 13–14 (alleging that defendants required plaintiffs 
“to obtain counseling at crisis pregnancy centers that are often religiously affiliated, and that 
proselytize,” thereby imposing on plaintiffs and advancing “a particular set of religious beliefs”); 
Garza Second Amended Complaint, supra note 268, at 16–17 (same). 
 
12 Ralph.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:43 PM 
298 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:259 
 
similarly situated.272 J.D., who entered the United States as an 
unaccompanied minor (“UC”) was in the custody of the federal 
government when a medical examination revealed she was pregnant.273 
J.D. sought to have an abortion, and despite securing a sponsor and other 
necessary requirements, such as private funding for the abortion and 
transportation for the procedure, officials of the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (“ORR”) refused to release her for the abortion.274 J.D. also 
alleged ORR officials forced her to undergo counseling provided by 
religiously oriented crisis pregnancy centers.275 The initial complaint was 
brought on behalf of a proposed class of all other pregnant unaccompanied 
immigrant minors in ORR custody, including those who would become 
pregnant during the pendency of the lawsuit.276 
The case proceeded along two tracks: one track was specific to J.D. and 
her individual needs, and the other track concerned the class. Prior to 
certifying a class of “all pregnant UCs who are or will be in legal custody 
of the federal government,”277the plaintiff sought,278 and the district court 
granted, a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) requiring the defendants 
                                                   
272. See Garza Complaint, supra note 266, at 1.  
273. Id.; J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2019). As explained in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in 
J.D. v. Azar, “minors in the United States with no lawful immigration status and no parents or legal guardians 
in the country able to care for them”; thus, after having been apprehended by immigration authorities at the 
border, they are referred by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR), a program in the Department of Health and Human Services (DHS). See J.D., 925 F.3d at 1300–01 
(citing 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(A) (2012) and U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN PROGRAM FACT SHEET 1–2 (Mar. 2019), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190331205756/https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
Unaccompanied-Alien-Children-Program-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8J9-JP2D]).  
274. J.D., 925 F.3d at 1303–04.  
275. See Garza Complaint, supra note 266, at 13–14. 
276. Id. at 11. The plaintiffs also later filed a second amended complaint. See Garza Second 
Amended Complaint, supra note 268, at 1. The defendants moved to dismiss the second amended 
complaint. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) at 1–2, Garza v. Hargan, No. 1:17-cv-02122, 2017 WL 
9854552 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2017). The defendants’ motion to dismiss was later denied as moot in light 
of the appeal of the class certification and injunction decision to the D.C. Circuit. In addition to the 
litigation that is the subject of this Article, J.D. also brought a habeas corpus lawsuit in Texas state 
court, challenging her confinement, and sought to join an already-pending lawsuit asserting similar 
claims in the Northern District of California. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, 
Garza, 2017 WL 6522466 (No. 1:17-cv-02122-TSC). The Texas case proceeded under seal; although 
J.D. was not successful in joining the Northern District of California case, that case proved to be a 
fruitful source of information for the plaintiffs’ counsel in J.D., as discovery documents in that case 
were ultimately filed in briefing in support of class certification. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of N. 
Cal. v. Burwell, No. 3:16-cv-03539, 2017 WL 1540606 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
277. Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at 1, Garza, 2017 WL 6522466 (No. 1:17-cv-02122-
TSC) [hereinafter Garza Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification].  
278. Application for a Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Garza, 2017 WL 6522466 (No. 1:17-cv-
02122-TSC) [hereinafter Garza Application for a Temporary Restraining Order].  
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“to transport J.D.—or allow J.D. to be transported . . . —promptly and 
without delay” for abortion counseling and ordering the government 
defendants to refrain from “interfering with or obstructing J.D.’s access 
to abortion counseling or an abortion.”279 
The question of the government policy affecting the proposed class of 
pregnant minors in immigration custody remained, and the case proceeded 
along that track. As the parties briefed the district court on class 
certification and the appropriateness of issuing a class-wide preliminary 
injunction, the plaintiffs added Jane Roe, Jane Poe, and Jane Moe, all UCs, 
as named plaintiffs.280 J.D. and Jane Roe served as class representatives.281 
The D.C. District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class 
certification, certifying a class of “all pregnant, unaccompanied minor 
children (UCs) who are or will be in the legal custody of the federal 
government.”282 The government defendants appealed the class 
certification decision and the preliminary injunction to the D.C. Circuit, 
which affirmed the trial court on class certification and sustained the 
injunction in large part.283 
                                                   
279. Id. at 2. The government immediately appealed the district court’s TRO, and a three-judge 
panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated part of the TRO and directed the court to allow HHS time J.D. to 
secure a sponsor and release her to that sponsor. Garza, 2017 WL 6522466 (No. 1:17-cv-02122-TSC) 
(vacating in part district court’s temporary order and directing district court to allow defendants time 
“for a sponsor to be secured for J.D. and for J.D. to be released to the sponsor,” rendering J.D. 
“lawfully able, if she chooses, to obtain an abortion on her own”). Four days later, the en banc D.C. 
Circuit recalled the panel’s mandate and remanded the case to the district court. Garza v. Hargan, 874 
F.3d 735, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The district court issued an amended TRO and subsequently, J.D. 
obtained an abortion. See Azar v. Garza, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1792 (2018). Following the en 
banc D.C. Circuit decision, Garza’s lawyers sought an amended restraining order directing defendants 
to make J.D. available for counseling and the abortion procedure, which the district court issued. Id. 
While the defendants planned to seek emergency review in the Supreme Court of the D.C. Circuit’s 
en banc order, J.D. obtained an abortion. Id. 
280. See Application for a Temporary Restraining Order at Exhibit 1, Garza, 2017 WL 6522466 
(No. 1:17-cv-02122-TSC) [hereinafter Jane Roe Declaration] (Declaration of Jane Roe); Declaration 
of Jane Poe at 1–2, Notice of Filing of Declaration of Jane Poe, Garza, 2017 WL 6522466 (No. 1:17-
cv-02122-TSC) [hereinafter Jane Poe Declaration] (Declaration of Jane Poe); Garza Application for 
a Temporary Restraining Order at Exhibit 1, Garza, 2017 WL 6522466 (No. 1:17-cv-02122-TSC) 
[hereinafter Jane Moe Declaration] (Declaration of Jane Moe).  
281. See Garza Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification, supra note 277, at 8 (identifying J.D. as 
class representative); Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Additional Class Representative in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 1, Garza, 2017 WL 6522466 (No. 1:17-cv-
02122-TSC) [hereinafter Garza Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Class Certification] 
(requesting addition of Jane Roe as additional class representative).  
282. Order Granting Motion for Class Certification and Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to the 
Class, Garza v. Hargan, No. 17-5236, 2017 WL 9854552 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 2018). The court also 
issued a preliminary injunction to restrict defendants from interfering with class members’ access to 
abortion, counseling, or other pregnancy related care. Id. The injunction also restrained defendants 
from revealing or forcing class members to reveal pregnancies or abortions, and from retaliating 
against class members or shelters for actions related to abortions. Id.  
283. J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The D.C. circuit affirmed the portions of 
the district court’s preliminary injunction enjoining obstructions to abortion access. Id. at 1339. The 
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B. Conclusions About Individual Plaintiff Narratives Prior 
to  Certification 
Both Ms. L. and J.D. involved hard-fought battles over class 
certification, and both ended with grants of class certification. These class 
certification battles relied heavily on narrative, both in the form of the 
plaintiffs’ stories told in their own voices (as in signed declarations) and 
in those stories narrated by the plaintiffs’ attorneys and, later, by 
defendants’ attorneys and by judges. 
A critical narrative analysis of all the filings prior to class certification 
in both cases provides valuable lessons about the specific way advocates 
use narrative to establish (or attack) commonality and the other 
requirements for class certification.284 As the rest of this section explains, 
this critical reading yields significant observations about the 
transformative way the plaintiffs’ narratives in these cases use narrative 
coherence and correspondence; about the unexpected way the narrative 
contest plays out in class certification debates; and about the way pre-
certification narratives persuade. 
1. Plaintiff Narratives: Minimal Narrative Coherence and “Die 
Cut”  Similarity 
A critical reading of the case documents first shows that, while the 
plaintiffs’ narratives in these cases are short, they evince the use of 
sophisticated narrative techniques. Indeed, the individual narratives used 
in these cases are carefully crafted stories, both in attorney-written 
documents and in the individual declarations signed by the plaintiffs. As 
this Part explains, a close reading of the plaintiff narratives demonstrates 
that they use specific narrative techniques with precision to demonstrate 
commonality. Class certification narratives make creative use of narrative 
tools and modify the traditional characteristics of persuasive narratives in 
order to meet the unique standards of Rule 23. In particular, class 
certification narratives eschew traditional narrative correspondence and 
instead adopt what this Article calls “die cut” narrative correspondence. 
As well, class certification narratives aim at “minimal” 
narrative  coherence. 
From the very first filings in both cases, the plaintiffs’ narratives are 
strikingly succinct. For instance, in Garza, individual plaintiffs’ stories 
                                                   
court also rejected defendants’ mootness arguments because of the “inherently transitory” exception. 
Id. at 1307. 
284. In addition to this narrative analysis, there is also room for a substantive-law analysis of the 
plaintiffs’ legal claims. Given this Article’s focus on narrative in class certification decisions, this 
section is limited to narratives and does not take up the substantive merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.  
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are told in brief form. The original plaintiff J.D.’s declaration is only two 
pages long.285 Similarly, Jane Roe’s, Jane Poe’s, and Jane Moe’s 
declarations are only two pages long.286 
These declarations are not just similar for their brevity; they are highly 
conventionalized.287 They use similar phrasing, almost boilerplate. For 
instance, the declarations of J.D., Jane Roe, Jane Poe, and Jane Moe all 
contain common sentences, such as, “I came to the United States from my 
home country without my parents,”288 and “I do not want to be forced to 
carry a pregnancy to term against my will.”289 There is no gesture towards 
authenticity of voice or point of view in these declarations—they are 
clearly attorney-drafted, and we do not “hear” the plaintiffs themselves.290 
The same brevity and conventionality is evident in later documents in the 
case that are more obviously expected to speak in the attorney’s voice.291 
The narratives are brief and stylized, but they are still narratives. They 
have all the characteristics of a narrative, including human characters, a 
“trouble” that requires efforts at redress, and organization that is ordered 
in time like a plot.292 These are multiple discrete narratives with the same 
key points: arrival, detention, discovery of pregnancy, decision to seek an 
abortion, and denial of access. 
Similarly, in Ms. L., the stories of the two named plaintiffs were 
initially told in the complaint and amended complaint, and in declarations 
from Ms. C. and Ms. L. In terms of their substance, Ms. L.’s and Ms. C.’s 
declarations each take up no more than two pages, and they are (as in J.D.) 
strikingly similar, despite the different case facts. Even language that 
gestures at individual point of view and voice is in fact boilerplate. For 
instance, Ms. L.’s declaration contains the following sentences: “I hope I 
                                                   
285. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Her Application for a Temporary Restraining 
Order and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Garza v. Hargan, No. 17-5236, 2017 WL 9854552 
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2017) [hereinafter J.D. Declaration] (Declaration of J.D.).  
286. See Jane Roe Declaration, supra note 280, at 1–2; Jane Poe Declaration, supra note 280, at 1–
2; Jane Moe Declaration at 1–2, supra note 280, at Exhibit 1.  
287. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 32, at 127–28 (describing “conventionalized” stories 
as ones that present the same kind of “match-up”).  
288. J.D. Declaration, supra note 285, ¶ 2; Jane Roe Declaration, supra note 280, ¶ 2; Jane Poe 
Declaration, supra note 280, at 1–2; Jane Moe Declaration, supra note 280, at ¶ 3.   
289. J.D. Declaration, supra note 285 at ¶ 16; Jane Roe Declaration, supra note 280, ¶ 9; Jane Poe 
Declaration, supra note 280, ¶ 10; Jane Moe Declaration, supra note 280 ¶ 9.   
290. See ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 70 (“Voice in narration is a question of who it is we ‘hear’ 
doing the narrating.”).  
291. For instance, in a supplemental memorandum in support of class certification, the J.D. 
plaintiffs’ counsel describes Jane Roe’s journey to the U.S., subsequent discovery of her pregnancy, 
and efforts to obtain an abortion in a paragraph that takes up about half of a page. See Supplemental 
Memorandum Regarding Additional Class Representative in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification at 2, Garza v. Hargan, No. 17-5236, 2017 WL 9854552 (D.C. Cir. Oct 20, 2017).  
292. See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text.  
 
12 Ralph.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:43 PM 
302 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:259 
 
can be with my daughter as soon as possible. I miss her so much and am 
scared for her.”293 Ms. C.’s declaration contains similar language, stating 
“I hope I can be with my son very soon. I miss him and am scared 
for  him.”294 
Likewise, in the Ms. L. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, the 
Background (which states the case’s underlying facts) and the Argument 
both filter the narratives through attorneys’ voices to make them as similar 
as possible.295 The stories are stripped down to bare facts, presented in the 
same order, and include the same pieces of information.296 
In short, the plaintiffs in both cases craft narratives that use matching 
word choice, matching sentence structure, minimal reference to specific 
dates in time, and a general lack of specific detail and individual voice. 
These are unique attempts to build narrative coherence and narrative 
correspondence in the procedural context. 
First, regarding narrative coherence, recall that this feature of narratives 
looks for “internal consistency, how well the parts of the story fit together, 
and completeness, how adequate the sum total of the parts of the story 
seems.”297 In the Ms. L. and J.D. narratives, one can recognize what this 
Article terms “minimal” narrative coherence. In other words, in their 
stripped-down detail, the plaintiffs’ stories contain the parts required of a 
narrative, and nothing more. In this way, pre-certification narratives are 
unlike early narratives in traditional litigation; for instance, in traditional 
cases at the pleading phase, the parties are most concerned with including 
sufficient detail to make the merits claims plausible under the standard 
announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. 298 v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.299 
Second, regarding narrative correspondence, the Ms. L. and J.D. 
plaintiffs’ narratives also reveal that they are crafted with an eye towards 
a unique kind of narrative correspondence. The narrative correspondence 
these class action stories aim towards is not exactly like the kind of 
correspondence litigants strive for in other forms of litigation. To account 
for this difference in class action litigation, this Article proposes a new 
kind of narrative correspondence: “die cut” narrative correspondence. 
The narrative correspondence required by most litigation can be 
conceptualized as “linear” correspondence—an image that evokes a line 
                                                   
293. Petitioner-Plaintiff Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 95–96, ¶ 6, Ms. 
L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 3:18-cv-00428, 2018 WL 866500 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 
2018) (attaching declaration of named plaintiff Ms. L.). 
294. Restricted Declaration of Ms. C., supra note 257 at 31–33, ¶ 10.  
295. See Ms. L. Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification, supra notes 255, at 3–6,  9–
13. 
296. See id. at 9–11.  
297. Rideout, supra note 69, at 64.  
298. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
299. 556 U.S. 622 (2009); see Ralph, supra note 44, at 2.  
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stretching across time. In this model, the relevant reference point for a 
lawyer looking to establish similarity, to connect her case to establish 
narrative correspondence, is the past. In a successful case, the plaintiff 
will match her facts to an earlier set of facts. Because of the stare decisis 
concept that like cases should be decided in like manner, the line might 
be a zero-degree curve; because the common-law method permits growth 
and change of the law over time, we might envision the line as curving 
somewhat to reflect cases that recognize new factual situations where 
legal outcomes apply. 
In class actions prior to certification, on the other hand, the 
correspondence that plaintiffs seek to achieve is less about matching prior 
cases than it is about matching proposed plaintiff class members to each 
other. Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement makes the important inquiry 
about whether numerous parties all present the same narrative at the same 
time. The relevant match is not whether one party’s story matches past 
narrative exemplars, but rather whether current uniformity exists. 
Thus, this Article proposes a novel version of narrative coherence that 
plaintiffs pursue in class action cases: “die-cut” narrative coherence. In 
other words, uniformity of the kind that one might produce when using a 
press machine to cut several pieces of material from a pattern at the same 
time. Those pieces could be stacked one on top of the other and the 
“footprint” would not change. 
In non-class action litigation, cases can use other tools to show 
conformity with past decisions (in the spirit of “linear” narrative 
correspondence): for instance, history and public policy, as well as facts. 
As this Part has shown, advocates seeking to establish that all potential 
class members’ stories conform to a similar “die cut” shape use narrative 
techniques with surgical precision, because they have a narrower set of 
tools to use. 
Rather than using narrative to persuade a court that a client’s story 
matches a canonical legal narrative of liability, prior to class certification 
the plaintiffs’ counsel can be envisioned as attempting to demonstrate a 
new stock script or master narrative. By establishing the desired new 
script, counsel can show that all class members’ experiences are instances 
of that stock script, and thus that all can be resolved logically, 
economically, and efficiently at the same time. 
The absence of detail and individual voice that this Article has noted 
also interacts with the notion of stock stories and master narratives in that, 
by limiting unnecessary details and pursuing “minimal” narrative 
coherence, the plaintiffs may successfully avoid activating any powerful, 
unspoken master narratives that judges may unconsciously apply and that 
may disincline them towards the plaintiffs’ claims. As this Article has 
argued, Wal-Mart had the potential to invoke master narratives that could 
have affected the Court’s reception of the plaintiffs’ claims. 
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To sum up this first point, class certification narratives use narrative tools 
to achieve effects that meet the unique standards of Rule 23: “minimal” 
narrative coherence and “die cut” narrative correspondence. 
2. The Narrative Contest: How to Set the Magnifying Lens 
The second observation that a critical reading of the case documents 
yields is this: Class action plaintiffs’ narratives, like other litigation 
narratives, are susceptible to re-narration and involve a contest of 
narratives. Certainly, because class certification may be the most 
important decision in a case, one would expect the pre-certification 
narratives to be highly contested. Indeed, prior to class certification, 
individual plaintiff class members’ stories of the sort examined in the 
previous section are susceptible to re-narration by the parties, and 
ultimately by the court, as the case progresses. What makes public interest 
class action litigation unique is that the narrative contest plays out along 
a different dimension than in typical litigation. 
In typical litigation, each side engages in the contest of narratives, 
attempting to demonstrate the strength of its own version of the story, 
attempting to convince a jury or a judge or to achieve early resolution of 
the case through a dispositive motion or settlement. The traditional 
litigation narrative contest is between different narratives, usually 
describing the same underlying events (to the extent the facts are 
undisputed). It often invokes powerful underlying master narratives.300 To 
demonstrate the strength of its story, each side narrates and re-narrates the 
tale in different written and oral forms, often for different procedural 
purposes. 
In class actions, narration and re-narration occurs, but the battle is not 
about which of two stories is the better “fit”—the battle is over whether 
there is a common story at all. The contest of narratives centers on the 
appropriate level of generality at which to examine the stories’ 
similarities.301 At the class certification phase, the parties argue about this 
                                                   
300. See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 38, at 46 (describing the O.J. Simpson trial “as a contest of 
narratives” in which the contestants draw on “masterplot[s]”).  
301. As Malveaux has written, “[c]ommonality depends on the locus of analysis.” Malveaux, supra 
note 127, at 663. If the locus is framed in a certain way, with a focus “on the trees rather than the 
forest,” (for instance, in Wal-Mart, if the locus was to be “the thousands of supervisors in the field 
making myriad decisions that affect 1.5 million separate employees”) then commonality will not be 
easy to see; in that case, “it is easy to conclude that there is no common question to be answered that 
would help resolve the case.” Id. at 663–64. Focusing differently, however—on the forest, in 
Malveaux’s metaphor—can yield different results: in Wal-Mart, for instance, “if the locus is the 
company, which gives its agents the authority to make biased employment decisions while looking 
the other way, it is easier to see how the case can be resolved on a classwide basis.” Id. at 664. In this 
view, with the focus on the corporate employer, “[t]he various ways the discrimination plays 
out . . . becomes a red herring.” Id.  
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different kind of matching by manipulating the level of focus or generality 
at which they frame their competing narratives. 
Much like any item that appears smooth at a distance can appear rough 
under a magnifying glass or microscope, the narratives of a group of 
potential class members can appear to share significant commonalities 
when viewed at a high level of generality and can appear quite different 
when examined in detail. As the previous section showed, plaintiffs 
seeking certification use narrative techniques to make their stories appear 
common; those techniques enable advocates to smooth out differences in 
each plaintiff’s narrative, essentially “zooming out” to a point where all 
proposed plaintiff narratives look similar. Defendants opposing 
certification, on the other hand, will “zoom in” on specific details to make 
narratives appear richer and more unique; in doing so, they argue that the 
proposed class members’ stories are each sufficiently different and 
distinct that they cannot possibly be grouped together as narratives that 
share commonality. In other words, the parties are arguing about the right 
point at which to set a narrative magnifying lens. 
For example, in Ms. L., the government defendants argued that the 
plaintiffs could not have suffered a common injury because “family 
separation may result from a variety of different fact-specific scenarios 
that would be unique to each purported family unit,” and that a court 
would need to evaluate individually.302 The defendants attempted to show 
a lack of commonality by emphasizing differences in the way parents and 
children entered the country, and the presence or absence of personal 
documents: for instance, they argued that Ms. L.’s separation from her 
daughter was too different from Ms. C.’s separation from her son, because 
Ms. L. “had no identity documents” and was unable to “confirm the 
claimed relationship,” while Ms. C.’s occurred because she was 
“prosecuted for a criminal offense as a result of crossing 
the . . . border . . . unlawfully.”303 As the court later characterized the 
argument, defendants attempted to show that class treatment of separated 
families was inappropriate because “the circumstances surrounding each 
separation of parent and child are different.”304 By highlighting these 
differences, the government was using a high degree of magnification to 
zoom in to show differences in the narratives that bespoke a lack 
of  commonality. 
                                                   
302. Respondent-Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 10, Ms. L. 
v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 331 F.R.D. 529 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-00428). 
303. Id. at 1, 10–11. 
304. Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 5, Ms. L., 331 F.R.D. 529 
(No. 3:18-cv-00428). 
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The district court in Ms. L. ultimately found commonality was satisfied, 
despite “the circumstances giving rise to the separations of [Ms. L. and 
Ms. C.] and their children in this case, which are indisputably 
different.”305 The court concluded that the plaintiffs had proven 
commonality because they had successfully shown that the key facts 
“underlying their claims are the same: each was detained with their child 
by government actors, who then separated them from their children, or 
failed to reunite them, without a showing they were unfit or presented a 
danger to the child.”306 The court found that the claims did not “rest on 
the individual circumstances of each separation of parent and child.”307 
Rather, they rested on what the claims all had in common: policies and 
practices that were unlawful as to all class members or as to none.308 The 
court specifically called these policies and practices the “glue”—the very 
phrase used in Wal-Mart—that held the class together.309 
Similarly, in Garza, the government defendants attempted to defeat 
commonality by focusing closely on the plaintiffs’ distinct experiences. 
For instance, opposing class certification, defendants cited the “various 
circumstances” of the named plaintiffs, distinguishing Ms. Roe, who 
knew about her pregnancy before coming to the United States, from other 
plaintiffs who learned of their pregnancy while in ORR custody and had 
already voluntarily disclosed it to family members, and from other 
plaintiffs who did not wish to inform family members.310 The defendants 
argued “the circumstances of each class member will vary broadly, 
including . . . whether such procedure would be elective or necessary to 
avoid serious harm to the mother, . . . and the circumstances surrounding 
the minor’s pregnancy.”311 Similarly, defendants argued that the named 
plaintiffs could never establish commonality with respect to pregnant UCs 
who had no desire to obtain an abortion.312 In response, the plaintiffs 
argued that “minor factual variations in individual class members’ 
circumstances” could not defeat commonality and typicality; the 
magnifying lens for commonality needed to be set, they argued, only at 
                                                   
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 7. 
308. Id.  
309. Id.  
310. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification and a 
Preliminary Injunction at 15–16, Garza v. Azar, No. 1:17-cv-02122, 2017 WL 9854552 (D.C. Cir. 
Mar. 16, 2018). The defendants cited Wal-Mart in support of their commonality argument. Id.  
311. Id. at 13–14.  
312. Id. at 18–20.  
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the level that would show the “Defendants’ uniform policy” towards all 
pregnant UCs.313 
The district court agreed that the “variations in individual class 
members’ factual circumstances” did not defeat commonality because 
there were “key common circumstances”: class members were pregnant, 
had a right to privacy, and were subject to government policies while in 
government care.314 
After the district court certified a class, defendants argued to the D.C. 
Circuit that the finding of commonality was in error. They again argued 
that the stories of the four named plaintiffs all “implicated distinct 
circumstances that demonstrate the variability of the claims throughout 
the class,” adding such differences as “inability to return to [one’s] 
country of nationality,” “varying stages . . . of pregnancy,” and “different 
ages and maturity levels.”315  
The D.C. Circuit refused to zoom in to that level of detail and 
concluded that the narratives of the representative plaintiffs J.D. and Jane 
Roe were “substantially—arguably entirely—identical to those of the 
class.”316 As the court wrote, the class satisfied commonality and 
typicality because they all asserted claims that fit a common narrative: 
that they had all been affected by the department’s policy that allegedly 
“violate[d] the class members’ protected right to choose to terminate their 
pregnancies before viability.”317 In other words, the court would not zoom 
in to magnify the plaintiffs’ stories at such a searching level that the 
common story would be destroyed by “certain factual variations among 
the class members—namely, their age, maturity, stage of pregnancy, 
mental health, length of sponsorship search, and ability to return to 
country of origin.”318 
As this Part has shown, the narrative contest is present in public interest 
class actions, but it takes on a unique form in such settings. The contest 
of narratives at the class certification phase is like zooming in and out to 
focus a magnifying lens; in other words, determining that proper level of 
focus at which similarity should be examined. Wal-Mart teaches that Rule 
23 demands that class counsel present more than a broad-strokes 
                                                   
313. Plaintiffs’ Reply in Further Support of Their Renewed Motion for Class Certification and a 
Preliminary Injunction at 3, Garza, 2017 WL 9854552 (No. 17-cv-02122).   
314. Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Class Certification at 13, Garza, 2017 WL 
9854552 (No. 17-cv-02122).  
315. Brief of Appellants at 31–34, J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5093) 
[hereinafter Appellants’ Brief in J.D.]. The defendants’ briefing also demonstrated that other 23(a) 
elements, such as adequacy and numerosity, can also be tools for trying to create narrative differences. 
Id. at 27–31, 34–37. 
316. J.D., 925 F.3d at 1322.  
317. Id. at 1321. 
318. Id.  
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archetype of a legal claim; thus, narratives cannot be examined at a level 
of focus so high that all one can see is the law claimed to have been 
violated—with myriad other differences obscured. But the examples of 
Ms. L. and J.D. show that the Rules 23 does not require such a tight focus 
that factual differences like those in Ms. L. and Ms. C.’s cases, or like 
those of the various Janes in J.D., are distinguishable. 
3. Details Can Make, as Well as Break, the Certification Showing 
A third observation that a critical reading yields is this: the class action 
rules push stories towards generality, with “zoomed-out,” stripped-down 
narratives; however, specific individual details remain convincing, even 
on certification questions. 
For instance, Jane Poe, one of the J.D. plaintiffs, had become pregnant 
as the result of a rape that occurred in her country of origin.319 The 
plaintiffs’ counsel did not include that allegation in her initial declaration 
or in their initial description of her situation, perhaps out of concern for 
destroying commonality or typicality, or perhaps out of fear of Poe not 
being believed.320 Poe’s rape does not appear in the plaintiffs’ Second 
Amended Complaint, possibly for the same reason.321 
Discovery in a separate litigation provided information that arguably 
strengthened the J.D. plaintiffs’ claims both on the merits and for the 
purposes of class certification.322 This discovery revealed more 
information about Poe’s pregnancy, including that it resulted from rape 
and that Poe had threatened to harm herself if forced to carry to term.323 
Importantly, this information gained through discovery—albeit in a 
different litigation—would figure prominently in the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion affirming certification. 
Later, defendants used this mental health information to argue that 
differences in the potential class members’ pregnancies could destroy the 
commonality required under Rule 23, claiming that class members 
                                                   
319. Id. at 1304. 
320. As described above, Poe’s declaration reads very similarly to the other named plaintiffs’ 
declarations. See Jane Poe Declaration, supra note 280, at 1–2; see also supra notes 286–291 and 
accompanying text.  
321. See Garza Second Amended Complaint, supra note 268, ¶¶ 24–26 (describing Poe as 
plaintiff).  
322. See Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification and a Preliminary Injunction Based on 
New Facts Demonstrating Continued Need for Urgent Relief at 2–3, Garza v. Azar, 2017 WL 
9854552 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 2018) (explaining that plaintiffs obtained additional facts through 
discovery in American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California v. Hargan).  
323. See id. at 9; see also id. at Exhibit I (displaying email exchange between government 
employees identifying that “[t]he Child/Minor claims that the pregnancy was a product of a rape by 
an unknown man” and that “she prefers to harm herself rather than continue with the pregnancy, with 
that in mind her mental health is at threat”).  
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“present distinct mental health issues that affect their decision-making 
abilities.”324 They argued that this kind of individual story that Jane Poe 
presented meant that class-wide relief would not be appropriate.325 
Ultimately, when the court found commonality and granted 
certification, the distinguishing details about Jane Poe’s assault did make 
it into the court’s decision on class certification. In just the fourth 
paragraph of its opinion affirming the certification of a class of pregnant 
UCs, the D.C. Circuit wrote the following: 
The claim of one minor in this case brings the policy’s breadth 
and operation into stark relief. She had been raped in her country 
of origin. After her arrival here and her placement in government 
custody, she learned she was pregnant as a result of the rape. She 
repeatedly asked to obtain a pre-viability abortion, to no avail.326 
Here, the court zooms in on the specific detail of Jane Poe’s story, finding 
it brings the case “into stark relief.”327 These sad and personal details, 
which defendants argued helped to destroy commonality, appears to have 
done significant work in convincing the D.C. Circuit to affirm class 
certification. 
Significantly, the details of Poe’s experience appear to have confirmed 
for the court that the class members all shared the same master narrative, 
rather than destroying the appearance of a shared story. The fact that even 
in the face of such circumstances, Poe would be denied medical care, 
demonstrated to the court that a government policy rather than a case-by-
case determination was at work in all the plaintiffs’ narratives. 
In public interest class action cases, policies may be the “glue” or 
connective tissue that can demonstrate that a class shares common claims 
and needs an indivisible remedy.328 Providing some details seems to be 
vital in building a narrative of those policies. Particularly in suits against 
government defendants, where plaintiffs and their counsel may not have 
access to the underlying policies and procedures resulting in their 
individual harms, details can help build the narrative in ways that capture 
the decisionmaker. Those details might weigh against commonality, but 
they get at the heart of identifying a problem that requires remedy on a 
large scale. Sometimes a striking detail is worth a thousand 
similar characteristics. 
                                                   
324. See Appellants’ Brief in J.D., supra note 315, at 34. 
325. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 12–13, J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-5093). 
326. J.D., 925 F.3d at 1300. 
327. Id. 
328. Particularly in suits against government defendants or other powerful defendants, where the 
plaintiffs and their counsel may not have access to the underlying policies and procedures resulting 
in their individual harms, discovery can help build the narrative.  
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This observation illustrates once more the tension between the 
individual and the collective, discussed earlier in this Article. This 
observation also show that narrative theory may inform the debate over 
whether courts’ interpretations of certification requirements are too 
restrictive. If details and other tools create the kind of psychologically 
persuasive narratives that move judges to take action—and yet class 
members are discouraged from using narrative details, out of concern 
those details will be used to defeat commonality—then a narratologist 
might say that the class action rules, as currently interpreted, put class 
action plaintiffs in a difficult, if not impossible, bind. An awareness of 
that bind is essential to the recommendations this Article makes in the 
following section. 
C. The Next Chapter: A Narrative Turn in Legal Argument on Public 
Interest Class Certification to Resolve the Narrative Bind 
This Article now turns to recommendations about class action practice, 
in light of the observations about the way narratives work in public 
interest class certification decisions. In particular, an awareness of 
narrative in public interest class actions prior to certification leads to the 
following recommendations. First, judges deciding certification should 
limit the inquiry into the merits as much as possible, informed by an 
awareness of the narrative bind placed on plaintiffs due to the competing 
requirements at the class certification phase. Second, judges and 
advocates considering the proper role for pre-certification discovery 
should similarly consider the narrative possibilities of such discovery. 
Finally, judges and advocates should take a “narrative turn” in legal 
argument on class certification, in order to insulate public interest class 
action certification decisions from the potentially outsized influence of 
unarticulated and unexamined, yet culturally powerful, master narratives. 
First, an awareness of public interest plaintiffs’ “narrative bind”—the 
way narratives must be used to demonstrate commonality at the class 
certification phase—should lead judges to limit the merits inquiry as much 
as possible at this point in the litigation. As this Article has shown, 
advocates in class actions who think carefully about narrative will use 
storytelling tools surgically and precisely prior to class certification, rather 
than use a more-narrative-is-always-more-effective approach. To support 
a showing of commonality, plaintiffs’ individual narratives often contain 
minimal narrative details, and are carefully crafted to resemble 
one  another. 
As a result of these certification-specific narrative goals, the narratives 
that judges might expect to see in merits arguments may be lacking at the 
certification phase. For instance, the stories in Ms. L. and J.D. are quite 
unlike those one would expect to see in individual asylum proceedings, 
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for instance, where individual details can help support a claimant’s case 
on the merits. The contrasts between the stories told here and the stories 
that the parties might tell or might have told in different legal contexts 
related to their plights help to illustrate the constraints that class action 
procedure places on narrative and should inform judges to apply a 
different narrative standard at class certification. 
For example, some of the plaintiffs whose stories are told in these 
sample cases were claiming a right to asylum. Individual asylum cases 
present a classic opportunity to use detailed storytelling for persuasion.329 
An individual claiming asylum must demonstrate a well-founded fear of 
persecution,330 and her testimony is subject to careful review for 
credibility, persuasiveness, and specificity.331 The applicant’s testimony 
is often the core of her case, and her testimony will be assessed by the 
factfinder.332 A claimant’s narrative can be harmed by things like 
“inconsistencies” and “small mistakes.”333 The richness of these “other” 
                                                   
329. See, e.g., Stacy Caplow, Putting the “I” in Wr*t*ng: Drafting an A/Effective Personal 
Statement To Tell a Winning Refugee Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 249, 255–
57 (2008) (“As every experienced asylum advocate knows, the personal statement describing the 
grounds for asylum is the ‘centerpiece’ of the asylum application . . . . [A personal statement should] 
strive for a . . . comprehensive, creative, and painstakingly detailed document that delicately balances 
the case theory and the client’s voice but also tells a story of courage, suffering, loss, sacrifice, and 
exile.”); Stephen Paskey, Telling Refugee Stories: Trauma, Credibility, and the Adversarial 
Adjudication of Claims for Asylum, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 457, 460 (2016) (“Claims for asylum 
are a striking example of storytelling in the context of law . . . . [W]hether asylum is granted depends 
largely on the applicant’s ability to tell a ‘good’ story; one an immigration judge deems to be 
‘credible’ and that fits within the statutory definition of a ‘refugee.’”).  
330. To be entitled to the refugee status that makes an individual eligible for asylum, she must 
demonstrate she is “unable or unwilling to return to” the country in which she last habitually resided 
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (2012) (defining 
“refugee”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (stating that the federal government may grant asylum 
to an alien if, among other things, there is a determination that the alien is “a refugee”); id. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (providing that “the burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the 
applicant is a refugee”).  
331. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain 
the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that 
the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.”). Similarly, as Flores shows, once a class is certified, that 
opens up room for more-detailed narratives that can show substantive violations of law and persuade 
a decisionmaker. Recent declarations filed in Flores to demonstrate the need for continuing oversight 
and involvement, for instance, utilize a high degree of detail, individual voice, and other 
narrative  techniques. 
332. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (identifying factors on which trier of fact may base a 
credibility determination, including “the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or 
witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the 
applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements, . . . the internal consistency of each such 
statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record, . . . and any inaccuracies 
or falsehoods in such statements”).  
333. See Caplow, supra note 329, at 255. Some of the characteristics of narratives of trauma 
survivors actually weight against finding their narratives credible. See Paskey, supra note 329, at 494 
(“[N]early all of the criteria used to assess credibility are unreliable when applied to the stories told 
by trauma survivors.”).  
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stories, told in the context of individual claims or after the class 
certification hurdle has been overcome, contrasts sharply with the 
stripped-down certification narratives in J.D. and Ms. L. 
In short, the stories told to achieve class certification and the stories 
told towards more merits-related inquiries differ sharply because of the 
requirements of the different procedural standards. A plaintiff class 
attempting both to meet the class certification standards and to make a 
strong showing on the merits would find itself in a “narrative bind.” To 
the extent that Wal-Mart both enables judges to inquire into the merits at 
the class certification phase, but also leaves considerable leeway 
concerning how searching that inquiry ought to be, an awareness of the 
narrative bind ought to encourage judges to limit the merits inquiry until 
later in the litigation. 
Second, an awareness of the “narrative bind” should also inform pre-
certification requests for and decisions about discovery. This point is 
particularly salient in public interest litigation, where information about 
plaintiffs’ claims is particularly likely to be in the hands of government 
defendants and inaccessible without formal discovery. Advocates seeking 
discovery and judges considering pre-certification discovery should 
consider carefully the way that the details learned through discovery may 
support or detract from commonality and should consider especially the 
extent to which discovery may provide information that can supply the 
“glue” required for commonality. As the J.D. litigation demonstrated, 
access to information (including through pre-certification discovery) can 
help plaintiffs demonstrate the minimal coherence and die-cut similarity 
that the certification question demands. In J.D., the discovery materials 
came from a separate, related litigation; in future cases, judges could use 
the broad discretion granted by Rule 23(d) to permit early-stage, focused 
discovery into matters relevant to certification. 
The final recommendation this Article makes is for judges and lawyers 
to take what I call a “narrative turn” in their class certification arguments 
and analysis. As this Article has shown, class action certification, 
particularly as it concerns the “commonality” requirement, can be 
influenced by unarticulated, unexamined assumptions about narratives. 
To ameliorate the effects, and to allow the class action to function as the 
drafters of the modern Rule 23 intended, advocates and judges should both 
work to make these unseen master narratives and stock stories visible. 
When telling or transmitting plaintiffs’ stories in filings prior to 
certification, advocates should not only be aware of and use the narrative 
tools that will best serve their purposes; they should also be prepared to 
speak clearly about the way narrative reasoning may be influencing the 
certification question. Wal-Mart is a paradigmatic example of the way 
different, yet powerful, cultural master narratives can be implicated in 
court decisions on commonality. For instance, advocates should be 
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prepared to point out when a particularly powerful master narrative 
appears to be capable of supplying “glue” that is not there, or when a 
contradictory master narrative makes it harder for a party to point to the 
“glue” in its case. By placing more emphasis on the narratives underlying 
the parties’ competing stories, advocates will focus the certification issue 
to be less abstract. This Article’s recommendation is not for advocates to 
warn judges that they may be in thrall to a particular master narrative—
that would hardly help an advocate’s case. Instead, advocates can observe 
and bring to the court’s attention the variety of master narratives that 
might “match” the case, on the theory that airing multiple master 
narratives will inoculate the reasoning in the case from unconscious and 
undue reliance on any one narrative. 
Furthermore, judges should consciously assess the narrative features of 
a proposed class; judges should consider the possibly relevant master 
narratives and stock scripts that might be influencing their reception of 
the parties’ stories, thereby minimizing the effect those mental constructs 
have on their decisionmaking. Judges can articulate the potential 
applicability of those master narratives and stock scripts when issuing 
orders on class certification, as Justice Ginsburg did in her dissent in Wal-
Mart. By addressing narrative as they give reasons for decisions on 
certification, courts will better ensure that decisions are free from the 
undue influence of powerful stock stories that threaten to undermine the 
law’s integrity. 
CONCLUSION 
Public interest class actions are powerful vehicles for groups to tell 
their stories in pursuit of justice. The stories plaintiffs tell in class actions 
can advance the substantive content of the law and can also influence 
public debate. Before the most powerful stories can be told in public 
interest class actions, plaintiffs must advance successful certification 
narratives—which are unlike stories told for other purposes and at other 
points in litigation. 
This Article has begun to illuminate how certification narratives 
function, in order to help judges, lawyers, and academics better 
understand this important phase in litigation. It has made a descriptive 
contribution by illustrating in detail how narrative techniques work to 
meet the unique procedural challenges of class certification in public 
interest litigation following Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Prior to 
certification, advocates must use narrative coherence with delicacy and 
must aim at a modified version of narrative correspondence. Advocates 
must also carefully select the level of generality at which they frame client 
stories to achieve their ends. And finally, advocates must remain aware of 
the tension between the innate desire for persuasion, which relies on 
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detail, and the stripped-down version of narrative required by the Federal 
Rules and the Supreme Court’s class action jurisprudence. 
Recognizing this tension, this Article has also argued that courts and 
lawyers should pay greater attention to the desire for and complications 
of storytelling in class action cases. With greater attention to narrative 
techniques and narrative effects, public interest class actions can better 
fulfill the original goals of Federal Rule 23(b)(2). 
